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ASCERTAINING STATE LAW: THE CONTINUING ERIE
DILEMMA
Geri J. Yonover*
Sometime after May 1, 1836, a citizen of Maine, the holder of negotiable
paper, sued a New York defendant to collect payment.' Almost 100 years
later, a Pennsylvanian was struck by a train while he walked along an out-
of-state defendant's right of way. 2 Between the resolution of these two cases,
brought into federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,3 lies a
juridical chasm.
This year marks the golden jubilee of the railroad case-a decision which
has been called "a star of the first magnitude in the legal universe ' 4 and
"one of the most important cases at law in American legal history.''s
B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law. Assistant Professor,
Valparaiso University School of Law. The author thanks Dean Ivan Bodensteiner of Valparaiso
University School of Law, and Professor Allan R. Stein, Visiting Professor at the University
of Texas School of Law (Austin), for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this article;
Chris Harris and Gale Carmona for their diligent and enthusiastic research assistance; and
Evelyn, Allen for her secretarial support.
1. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (applying federal common law). For an
interesting modern discussion of Swift v. Tyson, see Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE
L.J. 284 (1969). Although one pre-Erie commentator noted that the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
was then "too firmly settled to be shaken," Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-
Made State Law in State and Federal Courts, 4 ILL. L. REv. 533, 551 (1910), another "seized
lit] by. the juristic beard, [and] dragged [it] into the legal limelight" for a prophetic discussion
urging (1) reversal by the Supreme Court; (2) amendment of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
requiring federal courts to follow state court decisions; or (3) passage of state statutes controlling
many questions of "commercial law and general jurisprudence." Note, Seven Implications of
Swift v.. Tyson, 16 VA. L. REV. 225 (1930). Cf. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 526 (1928) (describing Swift as
"mischievous in its consequences, baffling in its application, and ... a perversion of the
purposes of the framers of the First Judiciary Act.").
2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982). Jurisdiction based on diversity, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78, preceded federal question jurisdiction, Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat.
470, by over three quarters of a century.
4. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TisE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4 (1977).
5. Address of Justice Black, 13 Mo. B.J. 173, 174 (1942). Cf. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
TE FEDERAL COURTS 355 (4th ed. 1983) ("It is impossible to overstate the importance of the
Erie decision."). Harry Tompkins, of course, was "entirely oblivious ... that he was entering
a hall of legal fame .. " Harnett & Thornton, Precedent in the Erie-Tompkins Manner: A
Decade in Retrospect, 24 N.Y.U.L. REv. 770 (1949).
Note that 1938 not only marked the birth of Erie but also the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See generally Knowlton, The Impact of Erie Upon the Federal Rules, 17 S.C.L.
REV. 480 (1965) (discussing conflict between Erie and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). One
observer suggests that the adoption of the Federal Rules ultimately had a greater impact on
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Nevertheless, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is not without its detractors. It
has been vilified as "reactionary" and the worst decision by the Supreme
Court in this century; 6 "the most colossal error the Supreme Court has ever
made"; 7 and "one of the most grossly unconstitutional governmental acts
in the nation's entire history.' In the Great Debates which Erie (and the
burial of Swift v. Tyson) engendered, eminent legal scholars rolled up their
sleeves and did intellectual battle.9 Whether characterized as a "[birooding
[o]mnipresence"' 10 or an "[i]rrepressible [mjyth,"" the Erie legacy still gen-
erates controversy within the legal community.'" The continuing debate as
to Erie's substantive law mandate finds participants in Judges Shadur and
Marshall of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. The debate between the two judges is the focus of this Article.
It is well-settled, however, that Erie and the Rules of Decision Act 3 require
that federal judges sitting in diversity cases apply the substantive law of the
litigants than did Erie. This may be because of the "curious relationship": Erie defederalized
substantive law, while the Federal Rules federalized procedural law. Judge Jack Weinstein,
Remarks at the Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Civil Procedure
(Jan. 9, 1988).
Although Erie held that there is no general federal common law, 304 U.S. at 78, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have applied federal common law in the face of a strong federal
interest in the issue. Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GEOROIA L.
REv. 1097, 1124 & n.135 (1985). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964) (federal law applies when foreign party involved); United States v. 93,970 Acres of Land,
360 U.S. 328 (1959) (federal law applies when essential federal interest, like military, is involved);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (noting federal interest in currency
matters).
6. Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and "The" True National Common
Law, 18 AM. U.L. REv. 316, 328 (1969). Professor Keeffe ranks the 20th-century Erie decision
with the 19th-century decision in Dred Scott. Id. at 316.
7. 2 W. CaossKEY, POLITICS AND THE CoNSrtrrON 907 (1953).
8. Id. at 916.
9. See, e.g., Keeffe, supra note 6; W. CROSSKEY, supra note 7; Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 383 (1964). See generally Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins Revisited, 17 S.C.L. Rav. 467-505 (1965) (papers presented by four
panelists for Thirty-fifth Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit).
10. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tomp-
kins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 267 (1946).
11. Ely. The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HAv. L. Rv. 693, 693 (1974).
12. Witness the rancorous exchange among academics in Westen & Lehman, Is There Lfe
for Erie After The Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH L. REv. 311 (1980); Redish, Continuing The
Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REv. 959 (1980); Westen, After
"Life for Erie"-A Reply, 78 MICH. L. Rv. 971 (1980).
13. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, provided: "the laws of the several
states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States in cases where they apply." In 1948, the phrase "civil actions" replaced
"trials at common law." 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
Of course the prior, if not correlative, determination concerns the substantive-procedural
dichotomy. Although some jurists would say that the Supreme Court has yet to "articul[atel a
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forum state to questions of a substantive character. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co.,' 4 the Supreme Court extended Erie and required federal
judges to apply the forum state's conflicts of law methods. However, neither
Erie nor any subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements have provided a
definitive answer to the related question-how to resolve legal issues that
have not been squarely decided by the highest court of the relevant jurisdic-
tion.'" Thus, the particular difficulties inherent in federal determination of
state substantive law persist.
The Erie substantive law "problem" contains at least four potential sce-
narios. In the first two, the state's highest court has spoken concerning the
issues to be resolved in the federal court; in scenarios three and four, the
state's highest court is silent. In the first situation, the highest court of the
state whose substantive law is applicable has previously (and relatively re-
cently) determined the issue posed in the diversity action or pendent claim.' 6
workable doctrine governing choice of law in diversity actions," Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring), see also Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct.
2239, 2241 (1988) (choice of law is a "sticky question"), a significant number of cases have
etched the perimeters of the issue. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965)
(although the federal service of process rule alters mode of enforcing state-created rights, not
to apply it would "disembowel" either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure
or Congress's attempt to exercise that power in Rules Enabling Act); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958) ("state law cannot alter the essential character" of federal
court's function). But ef. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949) (filing under federal rules does not toll local statute of limitations if state rule requires
service of summons for tolling). Ragan apparently is still viable after Hanna. See Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980) (Hanna distinguished rather than overruled
Ragan); Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (enunciating the "outcome-determi-
native" test). See also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987) (Hanna
requires applying Rule 38 of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to diversity actions).
Whether Erie was necessary to preserve constitutional principles, as suggested by Justice
Brandeis in Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78, is a matter of some controversy. See Shreve, Preclusion
and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEx. L. Rv. 1209, 1234 n.134 (1986) (discusses divided
commentary).
14. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). For an excellent critique of Klaxon, see 2 W.CaossxEY, supra
note 7, at 928-31.
15. Erie understandably sheds little light on the ascertainment of unclear state law problem
because the question was not presented. Recall that, in order to decide defendant's standard
of conduct in a suit brought in New York, the choices were either the federal general common
law a la Swift (under which Tompkins had the status of a licensee) or Pennsylvania law (which
probably would have termed Tompkins a trespasser) as the law of the place of the injury. See
Erie, 304 U.S. at 70.
16. While pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, once asserted, the federal court
is bound to apply state law to state claims. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726 (1966). The same doctrine applies in the context of statutory pendent jurisdiction. See.
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1982) (federal courts have jurisdiction of any state unfair competition
claims "when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant
variety protection or trade-mark laws"). See also Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1211 n.7
(3d Cir. 1980); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n.l
(2d Cir. 1956). Federal courts exercising pendent jurisdiction over state law claims must apply
1989]
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This situation is, of course, the least troublesome.1" In such a case, it is
generally agreed that the federal judge who, under the Erie mandate, must
apply state law, applies that law which has been enunciated by the highest
court of the state. The second scenario presents a chronological variation;
the state's highest court has spoken, but enough time has elapsed to cast a
shadow of doubt over the continuing validity of the old decision. In this
case, a federal judge is guided by Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am."8
In Bernhardt, the Court indicated that where there is "no confusion in the
[state's] decisions, no developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over
the established ones, no dicta, doubts, or ambiguities in the opinion of the
[state's] judges on the question, [and] no legislative development that prom-
ises to undermine the judicial rule," the federal court must, under Erie,
follow the decision by the state supreme court.' 9 This 1956 pronouncement
is the last word the legal community has received from the Supreme Court
concerning ascertainment of state law in diversity cases.
A third variation of the Erie "problem" arises when there is no decision
by the state's highest court but, perhaps, one by a trial or chancery court,
state law as that state's highest court would. Hillery v. Rushen, 720 F.2d 1132, 1138 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1983). See also Fleming v. Kane County, 636 F. Supp. 742, 748 (N.D. 11. 1986).
The Erie doctrine also operates whenever state law provides the rule of decision, irrespective
of the source of federal jurisdiction. It does not vary with the specific basis of jurisdiction
through which state-created causes of action arrive into federal court. Hamilton v. Roth, 624
F.2d 1204, 1210 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 461 (1967)
(federal question involving state law determination). Moreover, certain federal statutory pro-
visions may explicitly, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A)
(1982), or implicitly, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982), refer federal courts to state law to resolve
an issue arising in litigation under the statute. See LaBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism; The
Certification Experience, 19 GA. L. Rv. 999, 1001-02 nn.7-8 (1985). For an extensive analysis
of Erie's impact in areas other than diversity and pendency, see generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (1982) [hereinafter WRIGHT
& MILLER]; WESTEN AND LEHmAN, supra note 12. Clearly, Erie has broader federalism impli-
cations beyond the diversity jurisdiction context. See Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman: The
Eleventh Amendment, Erie and Pendent State Law Claims, 34 BuFFALO L. Rav. 227, 240 n.59
(1985). Moreover, federal courts obligated under the full faith and credit clause, 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1982), to apply state preclusion law, see Marrese v. American Academy of Orthapaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985), may face an Erie-type problem of ascertainment of unclear
state law. See Shreve, supra note 13, at 1234.
17. Cf. McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661-62 (3d Cir.) (noting
difficulty of determining state law when state's highest court has not decided issue), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
18. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
19. Id. at 205 (refusing to compel arbitration in federal court action when arbitration could
not be compelled in Vermont courts). Cf. Warner v. Gregory, 415 F.2d 1345, 1346-47 (7th Cir.
1969) (federal court need not automatically apply highest state court's last construction of a
statute, but can look to subsequently enacted legislation), cert. dismissed, 397 U.S. 930 (1970).
See also Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 606-07 (7th Cir. 1975) (noting that
force of Illinois appellate court decisions dwindled with time).
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or one or two congruent intermediate appellate court decisions. 20 In a series
of cases handed down in 1940, the Supreme Court ruled that where state
law furnishes the rule of decision, a federal court must follow the decision
of an intermediate appellate state court absent other persuasive evidence that
the state's highest court would hold otherwise .2  This quandary is best
illustrated by a recent series of decisions in which two federal circuits and
several state chancery courts, applying Tennessee law, addressed the issue of
20. Even prior to Erie, the Supreme Court had concluded that in circumstances where
federal courts did apply state statutory and local law, intermediate state court decisions must
be followed in the absence of an applicable determination by the highest state court. Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Erie R.R. Co. v. Hilt, 247 U.S. 97 (1918). See also IA J.
MooRE, W. TAOOART & J. WICKER, Mooxa's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.307 (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] (discussing pre-Erie law).
21. Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940); West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940); Six Cos. of California v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311
U.S. 180, 188 (1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1940).
Fidelity Union, the broadest (and perhaps the most infamous) of the 1940 decisions, involved
not an appellate court but a nisi prius decision. The issue was whether a Miss Peck created a
valid trust entitling her friend, Miss Field, to the savings bank deposit on Miss Peck's death.
In 1932 the New Jersey legislature passed four statutes that dearly appeared to permit an
individual to make a deposit in a savings bank for herself as trustee for another and create a
tentative trust, revocable at any time before death-a so-called "Totten trust." Prior to 1932,
New Jersey law had not permitted this type of trust. In 1935, Miss Peck made such a deposit
and subsequently died. In 1936, the New Jersey Court of Chancery, in two cases involving
other parties. "construed the statute away by decision." Clark, supra note 10, at 292. The
Third Circuit, in Fidelity Union, rejected the reasoning of the state chancery court and awarded
the deposit to the named beneficiary. 108 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1939). Even though the vice-
chancellor's decision would not have been binding on any other court of the state, nor even
on any other vice-chancellor, the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that it is unacceptable
that there be one rule of law for litigants in state court and another rule for those litigants in
federal courts. 311 U.S. at 180.
Fidelity Union and the other "excesses of 311" were sharply excoriated. E.g., Friendly,
supra note 9, at 400. See also 2 W. CRossKEY, supra note 7, at 920-26 (comparing Fidelity
Union to an event in "Alice in Wonderland"); Clark, supra note 10, at 290 (federal courts
"must act as a hollow sounding board"); Gibbs, How Does the Federal Judge Determine What
is the Law of the State?, 17 S.C.L. Ray. 487, 487 (1965) (in Fidelity Union, "the Erie Railroad
ran off the track"). Although Miss Peck lost the battle, she won the war posthumously, albeit
pyrrhicly. Soon after the Supreme Court decision in Fidelity Union, another state vice-chancellor
applied the statute exactly as had the Third Circuit in Fidelity Union. Hickey v. Kahl, 129 N.J.
Eq. 233. 19 A.2d 33 (N.J. Ch. 1941). On this basis, Miss Fields applied for a rehearing which
the Supreme Court denied. 311 U.S. 730 (1941), reh'g denied, 313 U.S. 550 (1941). motion to
file new petition gratted, 314 U.S. 709 (1941).
Though some feared that these 1940 decisions forced federal judges "to play the role [sic]
of ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state," Richardson v. Commissioner,
126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942), the Supreme Court later dispelled much of those fears. See
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); King v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153 (1948). In King, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's refusal to be bound by an unreported decision of a state trial court. 333 U.S. at 161-
62. In Bernhardt, the Supreme Court issued guidelines in the determination of state law. 350
U.S. at 205. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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the descendibility of the right of publicity and reached varying results.,
Lastly, let us assume that a case is in federal court in State X, and State
X's law is clearly applicable. 23 Again, the forum state's law will apply because
of diversity-based jurisdiction, traditional pendency, or because the federal
question involves a state law issue. 24 State X's highest court has not addressed
the issue posed. State X's judiciary is divided into two or more appellate
court districts. 3 At least two of these intermediate appellate courts have
22. In a 1980 diversity case, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee does not recognize a
descendible right of publicity. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). In 1981, the Second Circuit accepted as controlling
the Sixth Circuit's determination of Tennessee law and barred defendants from marketing an
Elvis Presley poster. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). Plaintiffs then requested the Second Circuit to recall its mandate
in light of an intervening Tennessee Chancery Court decision holding that Tennessee does
recognize a descendible right of publicity. See Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, Inc., 7 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2204, 2206 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1981). Subsequently, in 1982 another Tennessee
Chancery Court ruled that state law does not recognize a descendible right of publicity. Lancaster
v. Factors Etc., Inc., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1109, 1110 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1982). Finding no
basis to conclude that Tennessee law had authoritatively changed since 1981, the Second Circuit
denied recall of its mandate. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
But see id. at 13 (Mansfield, J. dissenting) (given the conflicting decisions of lower Tennessee
courts, "orderly development and authoritative exposition of state law" required federal court
to decide case according to what it believes to be "the more rational basis").
23. Or State Y's law is applicable, because forum State X's conflict of laws approach points
to State Y. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
24. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (decision of state's
highest court controls as to undecided state law issue which determines resolution of federal
question; absent such a decision, federal court should examine state lower court decisions and
then determine controlling state law). See also Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 331 U.S.
798 (1947) (following Illinois right of reverter law in tax action); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472 (1949) (applying state law to decide how foreign company may liquidate). To see the role
which certification has in the process, see Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo.),
certifed question answered, 184 Colo. 1, 517 P.2d 1331 (1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.
1975); D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I), aff'd, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973), certtifed question answered, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524, qffd,
518 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1975). A further example indicating federal dependency on state law is
foreclosure of copyright mortgages, which is also subject to varying state laws. P. GowasTEa,
CoPYuoIr, PATENT, TRADEARK, AND RELATED STATE DocTRnEs 789 (2d ed. 1981).
25. At present, some 37 states have a tri-level judicial system-trial court, intermediate
appellate court and highest appellate court. Of these, 15 states have more than one intermediate
appellate court: Arizona (two divisions); California (six districts); Florida (five districts); Arizona
(two divisions); California (six districts); Florida (five districts); Illinois (five districts); Indiana
(four districts) (fourth district includes all counties of the state); Louisiana (five districts);
Michigan (three districts); Missouri (three districts); New York (four judicial departments); Ohio
(twelve districts); Oklahoma (four divisions); Tennessee (three divisions); Texas (fourteen dis-
tricts); Washington (three divisions); Wisconsin (four districts). Thirteen states lack an inter-
mediate appellate court: Delaware, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See
generally M. HoucH, THE AMmIucAN BENCH (4th ed. 1987-88).
For purposes of this article it is interesting to note that states differ in the intra-state
precedential effect of their appellate court decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 144-
[Vol. 38:1
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handed down decisions directly on point. These decisions conflict, Under
the aegis of Erie, what must the federal judge do? If she or he neither
abstains from deciding nor certifies the precise issue to State X's highest
court, 27 then resolution of the issue in federal court is required.
This Article will examine the various solutions proposed by federal judges
to address the problems inherent in the fourth scenario, and will particularly
focus on the debate currently waged by two such judges in the Northern
District of Illinois. This debate concerns two interpretations of the Erie
mandate. The debate focuses on the situation in which intermediate appellate
court decisions conflict and no state supreme court authority exists. Such a
situation occurs when the state's highest court has never addressed the issue
or, if so, the decision has died of old age; i.e., it is no longer a valid
statement of state law. One approach, favored by many of the judges in the
Northern District of Illinois,28 particularly Judge Marshall,9 suggests that
Erie requires a federal court sitting in diversity to predict what the highest
68. Compare the Oklahoma rule, for instance, with the rule in Illinois. In Oklahoma, opinions
by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, absent approval by a majority of the Oklahoma Supreme
Justices for publication in the official reporter, are not precedential and do not announce
principles of state law which a federal court must follow in diversity cases. OvI.A. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20 § 30.5 (West 1988). See also Russell v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 111, 113
(E.D. Okla. 1976) (applying state statute). In Illinois, appellate courts' decisions are binding
on state trial courts and, in the event of a conflict, the trial court must follow the decision of
the appellate court district in which it sits. See People v. Thorpe, 52 Il. App. 3d 576, 579, 367
N.E.2d 960, 963 (2d Dist. 1977); Garcia v. Hynes and Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 I1. App.
3d 479, 482, 331 N.E.2d 634, 636 (3d Dist. 1975). See generally Mattis & Yalowitz, Stare
Decisis Among [sic] the Appellate Court of Illinois, 28 DE PAuL L. Ray. 571 (1979). Since
1935, an opinion of one Illinois appellate court is binding on all inferior state courts. Hughes
v. Medendorp, 294 Ill. App. 424, 427-28, 13 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (1938) (citing ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 41 (Smith-Hurd 1935)).
26. The doctrine of abstention, and its subspecies, is discussed infra at notes 43-78 and
accompanying text.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 79-133 for discussion of the availability of certification
in certain jurisdictions.
28. See, e.g., Fowler v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 653 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (Norgle,
J.); Maduff v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 657 F. Supp. 437, 440 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (Bua, J.); Kunz v.
Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (same); American Dental Ass'n v. Hartford Steam
Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 625 F. Supp. 364, 366-67 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Plunkett, J.); Pelizza
v. Reader's Digest Sales & Services Inc., 624 F. Supp. 806, 810 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Will, J.); Barr
Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 583 F. Supp. 248, 252-55 (N.D. 11l. 1984) (removed by defendant from
Cook County Circuit Court) (Moran, J.); UNR Industries, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 607
F. Supp. 855, 863-68 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Hart, J.); Strader v. Union Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp.
159, 161 (ND. Ill. 1980) (Aspen, J.); National Acceptance Co. v. Medlin, 538 F. Supp. 585,
588 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Getzendanner, J.); Henke v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Ill., No. 80 C 5068,
slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1981) (Moran, J.). Judge Marshall's straight predictive approach
also flourishes in the Southern District of Illinois. See, e.g., Duensing v. Tripp, 613 F. Supp.
766, 768 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (Foreman, C.J.).
29. The following cases illustrate Judge Marshall's approach: Roberts v. Western-Southern
Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 53845 (N.D. Il1. 1983); Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641,
643-45 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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court of the state would decide, giving due consideration to the varied
appellate court decisions, and to hold accordingly. This approach views the
appellate court decisions issued by different districts in an even-handed
manner. Another approach, suggested by Judge Shadur,30 requires that the
federal court decide issues of substantive law in the same manner as a state
trial judge, sitting in the same location, would decide those issues. Judge
Shadur's method, subject to certain refinements, requires the federal court
to follow the decision enunciated by the state appellate court in the district
in which the federal court sits. This Article concludes that Judge Shadur's
approach is flawed.
In addition to Judge Marshall's predictive approach and Judge Shadur's
internal choice of law methodology, some federal courts explore other ave-
nues, such as certification and abstention, to resolve intrastate decisional
conflict. The following discussion illustrates that, despite the availability of
certification and abstention, federal courts may, as a prior matter, still have
to resolve an ascertainment of state law issue.
I. To DECIDE OR NOT To DECIDE-WHEREiN A FEDERAL COURT SCORES
A T.K.O.3
Regardless of the source of jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine operates when-
ever state law provides the rule of decision. 2 Although a question of state
30. Zakarian v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 652 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 & n.19 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (removed by defendant from Cook County Circuit Court); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. AARF, Inc., No. 85 C 10555, slip. op. at n.7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1986); Jones v. Board
of Educ. of Township H.S. Dist. No. 211, Cook County, Ill., 651 F. Supp. 760, 766 & n.11
(N.D. Il. 1986); United States Home Corp. v. George W. Kennedy Constr. Co., 624 F. Supp.
528, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Rizzo v. Means Services, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115, 1131-33 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Weisberg v. Rafael, No. 86 C 7375 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 1986); Abbott Laboratories v.
Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193, 196-200 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (explaining dispute with
Judge Marshall's theory); Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841, 847-52 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (opinion appendix discusses Judge Shadur's approach); Slate Printing Co. v. Metro
Envelope Co., 532 F. Supp. 431, 434 (N.D. Il1. 1982); Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F. Supp. 561,
563 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps. League, 509 F. Supp. 323, 339
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
Judge Leinenweber has adopted Judge Shadur's formula. See Cresswell v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., No. 85 C 5822, slip op. at n.3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1986).
31. In boxing, a technical knock-out.
32. See supra notes 13-16. See also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff Assocs., 107 S.
Ct. 2759, 2771 n.2 (1987) (neither Erie nor the Rules of Decision Act scholarship establishes
that the statute applies only in diversity cases) (quoting Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy,
66 HAxv. L. REV. 1013, 1033-34 (1953)). Cf. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151, 161 n.13 (1983) ("Where Congress directly or impliedly directs the courts to look
to state law to fill in details of federal law, Erie will ordinarily provide the framework for
doing so.") (citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1967)). The opposite
view is an "oft-encountered heresy." Friendly, supra note 9, at 408 n.122.
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law may arise in an action based on diversity," one pendent to federal
question jurisdiction,3 4 or one incidental to the federal question presented,"
a litigant is not automatically assured that the federal court will resolve that
state law question. As noted earlier, a federal court can avail itself of at
least two exits: abstention and certification.3 6 Both procedures reflect the
federalism concerns implicit in the uneasy, quasi-sovereignty of the state and
federal judiciaries. In our country's judicial system state courts may, and
often must, interpret federal law, subject of course to Supreme Court
review."7 Federal courts, on the other hand, frequently rule on matters of
state law which cannot be reversed by state courts, but merely repudiated
by subsequent state court decisions.3" Thus, in certain situations it is "better"
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
34. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966) (judicially-created
pendency when recovery sought under both federal labor law and state common law); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(b) (1982) (statutory pendency for state unfair competition claims and federal patent
claims). See supra note 16.
35. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (federal question requires
resolution of state law issue).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 41-106. For a discussion of another judicial exit, see
infra note 40.
37. See generally Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 HAxv. L. Rav. 1485 (1987) (discussing federal interest in effective state court
systems). Compare the "reverse-Erie" doctrine, which requires that the substantive remedies
afforded by the states conform to governing federal maritime standards. Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (citing Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal
System,, 16 STA. L. Rv. 1, 34 (1963)).
38. If, for example, a federal court construes a state statute previously unexamined by the
state courts, the statute might be interpreted in a singular fashion. The rights of all other
litigants, however, may be governed by a state supreme court decision quite different from that
of the federal court. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30
(1959). "[N]o matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape
being a forecast rather than a determination." Id. at 27 (quoting Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941)). Cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 151-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (if state disagrees with federal court's interpretation
of state law, it can always clarify or change that law). However, even though the federal court
cannot finally settle the relevant question of state law, it does adjudicate the rights of the
parties before it. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1943).
For an interesting enumeration of state supreme court decisions explicitly rejecting federal
court readings of pertinent state law, see United States v. Buras, 475 F.2d 1370, 1373-74 n.5
(1972) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865 (1973). See also Kaiser Steel Corp.
v. W. S. Ranch Co., 81 N.M. 414, 467 P.2d 986 (1970) (water rights issue previously addressed
by federal courts). There, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided the issue in a way "dia-
metrically opposite to that reached by the [federal] court of appeals." D. BATOR, P. MIsHKiN,
D. SHAPto & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's TaE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEM 1005 (2d ed. 1973).
For an example of a state legislative response to a judicial decision, compare VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.1-309.1 (Supp. 1985) ("nonuse of [seat belt] devices [shall not] be considered in mitigation
of damages of whatever nature") with Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368
(E.D. Va. 1978) (failure to wear seat belt should be considered in mitigation inquiry). The
Wilson court reached its conclusion even while acknowledging. the initial legislation which
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for a federal court to allow a state court to resolve a state law question. Of
course, if a federal judge employs abstention or certification, the Marshall/
Shadur "dialectic" 3 9 may not be implicated. Similarly, dismissal of the case
under the forum non conveniens doctrine4° and transfer of venue based on
convenience"l also represent "decision ducking" on the basis of "case avoid-
ance, ' 4 2 thereby possibly avoiding the Erie ascertainment of law issue. What
follows is a digression concerning abstention and certification before further
analysis of the Erie mandate according to Judges Marshall and Shadur. The
point of the digression is to demonstrate that, despite the existence of these
"escape" doctrines, federal district courts may still have to confront an Erie
substantive law issue.
A. Abstention
The judicial doctrine of abstention43 was first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman." Pullman abstention is
provided that failure to use seat belts should not be deemed to constitute negligence so as to
trigger Virginia's contributory negligence defense. 445 F. Supp. at 1373-74. This "intersystemic"
(here state legislature and federal judiciary) response is discussed in LeBel, supra note 16, at
1035 n.108.
39. The term is used here to connote logical argumentation rather than in its strict Hegelian
sense. Dialectical materialism as advanced by Hegel, and later Karl Marx, viewed social and
economic events in terms of thesis (initial idea or event), antithesis (its opposite), and synthesis
(reconciliation of the two extremes). See generally G.W.F. HEGEL, HEoE.'s Pm.osoPHY OF
RPGor (1952) (developing dialectic theory). This is not to suggest, however, that the positions
of Judges Shadur and Marshall are not reconcilable, i.e., capable of synthesis. Cf. Friendly,
supra note 9, at 421 (Hegelian dialectic is at work-with Swift v. Tyson the thesis, Erie the
antithesis, and the new federal common law the synthesis).
40. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute"). For a persuasive argument that when jurisdictional inquiries are properly conducted,
the forum non conveniens doctrine is redundant, see Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A
Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L. Rav. 1259 (1986); Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. Rv. 781 (1985). But see Packel,
Congressional Power to Reduce Personal Jurisdiction Litigation, 59 TI'm. L.Q. 919, 923-26
(1986) (former Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice argues for validity of nationwide personal
jurisdiction subject only to forum non conveniens boundaries).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982) ("for the convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."). When the defendant in a diversity action moves for a § 1404(a)
venue transfer, the transferee court must apply the state law that would have applied in the
transferor court. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 626-43 (1964). Cf. In re Korean Airlines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 56 U.S.L.W. 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (where actions are transferred
to federal district court for consolidated pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, transferee
court may independently resolve issues of federal law already decided by appellate court in
transferor circuit).
42. See LeBel, supra note 16, at 1002. The author distinguishes forum non conveniens and
§ 1404(a) transfer, which involve avoiding the case entirely, from abstention and certification,
which involve "issue-avoidance." Id. at 1002-03. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, based
upon the interest in avoiding conflict between the courts and administrative agencies, furnishes
yet another example of "decision-ducking." Id. at 1025 & n.72.
43. See generally 17 WiUGr & MIuLER, supra note 16, at §§ 424147 (general discussion of
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appropriate when a state court's interpretation of a state statute may avoid
unnecessary determination of a federal constitutional question.45 While Pull-
man abstention applies only where the state court has not previously ex-
amined the case46 or where there are ambiguities in the challenged state
statute involving complex issues, 47 the Supreme Court has approved absten-
tion on Pullman grounds in many cases.4 The Pullman doctrine, like the
three other types of abstention,9 avoids unnecessary friction between federal
and state courts. It also promotes the vital judicial policy that disfavors
needless or premature resolution of a federal constitutional question. 0 More-
over, adjudication based on state law has only intra-state precedential effect,
whereas a federal court decision on the constitutional claim may have an
impact on other jurisdictions."
Although Pullman abstention arises in the context of federal question
jurisdiction, federal courts may often confront Erie ascertainment of state
law problems in determining the clarity and effect of whatever expositions
of the relevant state law are found. 2 Thus, even if a federal judge employs
Pullman as a "decision-ducking" device, an ascertainment of state law may,
as a prior step, still be necessary." Consequently, the divergent approaches
abstention doctrines). It may be more precise to refer to abstention doctrines, as the plural
encompasses the different factual situations, different procedural consequences, different policy
considerations and different validations. Id. § 4241. See infra note 49.
44. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
45. Id. at 500.
46. Orr v. Off, 440 U.S. 268, 278 n.8 (1979).
47. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (state land reform act
at issue); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 100 n.3 (1979) (state
automobile franchise act).
48. See, e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (domiciliary requirements for reduced
state university tuition); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v.
MacMulan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972) (state pollution law); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) (state law charging public utilities fees for use of public streets).
Where, however, the state right and the federal right are "as a practical matter coterminous,"
abstention is generally Inappropriate. McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 763 (2d Cir. 1976).
Pullman abstention does not abdicate federal court jurisdiction, it only postpones its exercise.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1981). However, federal courts may find themselves
abdicating jurisdiction after all if parties obtain relief from a narrow construction of state law.
49. The three other types of abstention are illustrated by Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943) (where state administrative process or domestic policies are implicated); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (where federal court is asked to enjoin good faith criminal proceed-
ings); and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
(where abstention avoids unnecessary duplicative, piecemeal litigation). See infra text accom-
panying notes 54-76.
50. The federal constitutional issue "might be mooted or presented in a different posture
by a state court determination of pertinent state law." County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 1&5, 189 (1959).
51. Connecticut State Fed'n. of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 486
(2d Cir. 1976).
52. See, e.g., id. at 485 (two unreported trial court decisions are not binding).
53. E.g., id. at 483-86; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.B. Bates, 542 F. Supp. 807,
818-19 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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taken by Judge Shadur and Judge Marshall theoretically could determine
the propriety vel non of Pullman type abstention. For example, Judge Shadur
might find clear and binding a decision of the First District Appellate Court
of Illinois and therefore find it unnecessary to abstain. In contrast, Judge
Marshall would be comfortable in not following the First District if its
decision did not "represent" the law of Illinois. He might then employ
Pullman abstention, and permit Illinois courts to construe the "unconstrued"
statute so as to avoid the federal constitutional issue.
The Supreme Court, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,14 enunciated a second
type of abstention. Burford abstention is appropriate "when the exercise of
jurisdiction by the federal court would disrupt a state administrative process
... or otherwise create needless friction by unnecessarily enjoining state
officials from executing domestic policies."" For example, the Court in
Burford concluded that federal court decisions which review the state agen-
cy's regulation of oil wells would endanger the success of state policies . 6
Therefore, abstention was proper. Based on notions of comity,17 Burford
abstention is also proper where there are present difficult questions of state
law concerning "problems of substantial ... import whose importance
transcends the result in the [instant] case . . . .' "
Burford abstention, however, has little impact in the area of Erie concerns,
other than the shared focus on federalism principles. The ascertainment of
state law problem in Burford is meager-necessitating an inquiry only as to
the presence and extent of a state regulatory scheme.' 9 Thus, even though
54. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Burford reflects the principles developed earlier by Justice Cardozo
in Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1933).
55. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959) (citations omitted).
56. Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
57. "This Court has also upheld an abstention on grounds of comity with the states when
the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court would disrupt a state administrative process."
Masuda, 360 U.S. at 185 (citations omitted).
58. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
See also Law Enforcement Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1986) (where
state has comprehensive regulation of insurance companies-a special state concern which would
be impaired by federal court intervention- Burford abstention is correct).
Unlike Pullman abstention, the procedural effect of Burford abstention is surrender of federal
court jurisdiction, not its mere postponement. Nor does there need to be present a constitutional
issue or a difficult and unresolved question of state law. Construction Aggregates Corp. v.
Rivera de Vicenty, 573 F.2d 86, 89 (1st Cir. 1978).
59. The Second Circuit described the appropriate analysis for determining whether Burford
abstention is appropriate:
(1) the order under attack was part of a unified regulatory scheme on a complex
subject matter of special state interest, a scheme in which the state administrative
agency and the state courts cooperated closely to safeguard the values of uniformity,
expertise, and due process; (2) the state had expressed its interest in unified deci-
sionmaking by creating a system on the state level to avoid multiple inconsistent
adjudications, a system that would be disrupted by the exercise of jurisdiction by
the federal courts; and (3) the issues sought to be adjudicated in federal court were
largely ones of state law.
Law Enforcement Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d at 43.
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Burford abstention, like Pullman abstention, is a form of "decision-duck-
ing," the Marshall/Shadur debate does not affect a Burford analysis.
Younger abstention is the third of the federal abstention doctrines. The
slogan "Our Federalism," coined by Justice Black in Younger v. Harris,60
reflects the notion that in certain circumstances federal courts should not
entertain constitutional challenges to state actions. Based on the principle of
comity, Younger abstention is proper where "absent bad faith, harassment,
or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for
the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings." 61 The doctrine also
applies to state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution,62
the collection of state taxes, 63 quasi-criminal proceedings conducted simul-
taneously in state court," and civil proceedings which implicate certain
discrete and important state interests. 6 Thus, Younger abstention permits
federal court intervention in these cases only if (1) the "state proceeding is
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith"; (2) there exists
"an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate equitable relief"; or (3) the
"challenged provision is flagrantly and patently violative of express consti-
tution prohibitions. '"6 Younger abstention, though based on the concept of
federalism, has no impact on the ascertainment of state law problem because
state law does not need to be ascertained in order to decide whether use of
the doctrine is proper.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States67 represents a
fourth category of cases in which a federal court should decline to exercise
60. 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("Our Federalism" describes a system in which both state and
federal government interests are taken into account land the government tries to avoid] excessive
interference in the state's activities."). The phrase in its unemphasized form was a particular
favorite of Justice Frankfurter. Wright & Miller, supra note 16 at § 4251. See generally Theis,
Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTmS L.J. 103 (1981) (courts need to give
greater guidance in use of Younger doctrine); Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SurF. U.L. REV.
1087 (1978) (federalism put forth in Younger without guidance to courts to aid in its use).
61. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976).
62. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (federal interference with state civil
proceedings just as serious as interference with state criminal proceedings).
63. See Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (federal courts
should avoid needless obstruction of state policy).
64. Jacobson v. Village of Northbrook, 824 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1987). (Younger
abstention bars a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of village ordinances).
65. Id. See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 444 (1977). For a recent Supreme Court discussion of the Younger doctrine, see Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). The lower courts "failed to recognize the significant
interests harmed by their unprecedented intrusion into the Texas judicial system" and should
have abstained. Id. at 1525.
66. Jacobson, 824 F.2d at 569-70 (citations omitted). It should be noted that since Younger,
the Supreme Court has never found that the exception for bad faith or harassment was
applicable, WIGarr & MILLER, supra note 43 at § 4255.
67. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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its jurisdiction. Colorado River "abstention"" applies to prevent duplicative
litigation in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of jurisdiction
by state and federal courts. 69 Emphasizing that the doctrine can be invoked
only in "exceptional" cases "for reasons of wise judicial administration"
and "conservation of resources,' 70 the Supreme Court noted that the doctrine
exists solely to avoid the danger of piecemeal litigation."
In at least some respects, Colorado River abstention is justifiable in a
much narrower group of cases than the Younger, Burford, and Pullman,
abstention doctrines. The Colorado River court, while finding abstention
proper in that case, emphasized the "virtually unflagging' ' 2 and "heavy"' 3
obligation of federal courts to exercise their given jurisdiction. Given this
language, proper use of Colorado River abstention has been infrequent.' 4
Moreover, in the context of diversity jurisdiction, Colorado River abstention
raises additional concerns involving the duty of federal courts to entertain
cases based on diversity of citizenship which, by definition, involves state
law.'5 As Judge Skelly Wright remarked, "Congress having determined that
68. Justice Brennan, writing for the Colorado River majority, appeared unwilling to delineate
the concept as abstention:
Given this obligation [for federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given theml,
and the absence of weightier considerations of constitutional adjudication and state-
federal relations, the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to
the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial admin-
istration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for
abstention, The former circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless exist.
Id. at 818 (emphasis added). See also id. at 816 n.23 ("Our reasons for finding abstention
inappropriate in this case ...."). However, lower courts and commentators have characterized
the doctrine as abstention. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d
38, 40 (2d Cir. 1986); Signady, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338. 1339 (5th Cir.
1985); Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TuL. L. Rav. 651
(1985).
69. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18. In Colorado River, a party sued by the United
States in federal court brought suit in the state court for purpose of adjudicating all the
government's state and federal claims. Id.
70. Id.
71. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19, 20 n.22
(1983) (Colorado River involved a federal statute whose "primary policy" was the avoidance
of piecemeal litigation).
72. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
73. Id. at 820.
74. See. e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 2 (dismissal on judicial or
administrative grounds requires "careful balancing .. .with the balance heavily weighted in
favor of accepting jurisdiction); Andrea Theatres, Inc. v. Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d
59, 62 (2d Cir. 1986) (state court should have broad jurisdiction to adjudicate federal claims if
federal court abstains); Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1983) (exceptional
circumstances must be present to warrant abstention based on wise judicial administration).
75. E.g.. Law Enforcement Ins. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38, 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1986). Where
there is little inconvenience to the parties, no substantial progress in the state suit when the
federal suit is filed, federal and state relief are of approximately equal efficacy, and no "novel
or obscure state law issues" exist, the case does not warrant Colorado River abstention. Id. at
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parties are entitled to invoke diversity jurisdiction, it is no business of the
federal court to withdraw that permission."76
Each of the four categories of abstention-Pu/lman, Burford, Younger,
and Colorado River-represents a form of "decision-ducking." However,
as has been noted, the determination as to whether one of these doctrines
should be used in a given case can itself require the ascertainment of state
law. Further, the Supreme Court has often cautioned that a federal court
may not abstain because of difficulty in determining state law or because of
the risk that it could err in predicting state law.' Perhaps heeding these
warnings or relying on their own judicial competence to ascertain state law,
federal judges do not often abstain.7
B. Certification
The Supreme Court first encouraged certification in Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd." At that time, 1960, only Florida had a statute providing for
42. However, Burford-type abstention is appropriate. Id. at 44. See aLso Park v. Didden, 695
F.2d 626, 633 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rejecting suggestion that "garden variety" issues governed
by state law are more appropriately decided in state courts); Bryant Elec. Co. v. Joe Raniero
Tile Co., 84 F.R.D. 120, 126 (W.D. Va. 1979) (illogical to permit a stay in diversity action
because of subsequently filed state court action).
76. Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L.
REv. 317, 325 (1967).
77. Smith v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1980).
See also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1958) (mere difficulty
in ascertaining state law does not justify abstention); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,
236 (1943) (federal jurisdiction may not be denied because state law is difficult to determine).
See also State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 542 F. Supp. 807, 818 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(ambiguity in state statute required for Pullman abstention). However, in Louisiana Power &
Light Co., an eminent domain proceeding based on diversity jurisdiction and involving an
unclear state statute, the Court held that the district judge properly abstained "rather than
himself make a dubious and tentative forecast." 360 U.S. at 29. Cf. County of Allegheny v.
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1959) (district court should adjudicate eminent domain
proceeding similar to Louisiana Power in the face of "clear and certain" state law).
78. "Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."
Colorado River Water Constr. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). For example,
neither Judge Marshall nor Judge Shadur has shown great inclination to abstain. See, e.g., E
& E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve Dist., 629 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. I1. 1986) (Shadur, J.);
Local 705, Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. Willett, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. I1. 1985), (Shadur,
J.); Coleman v. McLaren, 572 F. Supp. 178 (N.D. I. 1983) (Shadur, J.); Mechanical Sys.,
Inc. v. Cadre Corp., 567 F. Supp. 948 (N.D.Il. 1983) (Shadur, J.); Napoli v. Board of Trustees
of Thornton Community College, No. 83 C 1894 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1985) (Marshall, J.); 1980
Illinois Socialist Workers Campaign v. Illinois Bd. of Elections, 531 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. ill.
1981) (Marshall, J.); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Il. 1978) (Marshall, J.); Barszcz
v. Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 504, 400 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(Marshall, J.).
79. 363 U.S. 207 (1960). Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, noted the "rare
foresight" with which the Florida legislature had addressed the problem of unresolved state
law involved in federal litigation. Id. at 212.
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certification. 0 In 1967, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws and the American Bar Association approved the Uniform
Certification of Questions of Law Act." Presently only 12 states and the
District of Columbia lack some certification statute or rule.8 Two of these
states, California and Pennsylvania, have yet to authorize certification in
spite of the fact that their federal courts hear a very large volume of cases.8 "
Of the 30-odd states that have adopted certification procedures, eight make
certification available only to federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court.
8 4
The remaining states and Puerto Rico authorize their highest court to answer
questions certified by federal district as well as federal appellate courts,8"
and 13 states and Puerto Rico allow for certification from courts of other
states.8 6 Thus, the notion of certification is alive and well in many jurisdic-
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1957).
81. UmoaR CERTIF. OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 49 (1975).
82. These are Alaska, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. In 1981, the
Supreme Court of Utah withdrew its Certification Rule, adopted in 1975. The court based its
withdrawal on the current language of Utah's constitution which did not provide jurisdiction
for the court to answer a question certified to it by federal courts. Holden v. N L Indus., Inc.,
629 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah 1981).
83. Entire circuits have fewer cases than did the four federal district courts of California
in the year ending June 30, 1984-some 22,751 cases. See Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and
Unsettled State Law in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. Rv. 157, 163 n.43 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Law/Fact Distinction]. In the same time period, 12,188 cases were riled in Pennsylvania
federal district courts. Id. at 163 n.45. The reluctance of California and Pennsylvania to
authorize certification may relate, perhaps, to the perceived burden on already crowded state
court dockets.
84. FIA. CONST. art v., § 3(b)(6); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1974); FLA. App. R.
9.150; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-9 (1981); GA. S. CT. R. 37; HAWAn Rv. STAT. § 602-5(2) (Supp.
1984); ILL. S. CT. R. 20; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2-4-1 (Burns 1985); IND. R. App. P. 15; LA.
Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1 (West 1983); LA. S. CT. R. XII; Miss. S. CT. R. 46; Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 821.01-.12 (West Supp. 1984).
85. ALA. R. App. P. 18; ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. 12-1861 (1984); COLO. ApP. R. 21.1; 1985
Conn. Acts 85-111 (Reg. Ses.); IDAHO Ap. R. 12.1; IowA CODE ANN. § 684A.1 (1980); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3201 to -3212 (1983); Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.37; ME. App. R. 76B; MD. CTS &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to 609 (1984); MASS. GEN. R. 3.21; MASS. Sup. JUD. CT.
R. 1.03; MICH. GEN. CT. R. 7.305(b); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West 1988); MONT. SUP.
CT. R. 1; NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-219 (1985); N.H. S. CT. R. 12.34; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34.-2-
8 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE R. App. P. 467; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1601-13 (1973); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 28.200-.255 (1983); R.I. SuP. CT. R. 6; S.C. SUP. CT. R. 46; VERNON'S ANN.
TEX. CONST., art. V. § 3-C; TEX. R. App. PRO. 110, 214; WASH. R. App. P. 16.16; W. VA.
CODE 51-lA-I to -IA-12 (1981); Wy. R. App. P. 11.01; P. R. R. Cnv. P. 53.1(c).
86. IowA CODE ANN. § 684A.1 (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3201 to -3212 (1983); Ky. R.
Civ. P. 76.37; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1984); MASS. GEN. R.
3.21; MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1.03; MICH. GEN CT. R. 7.305(B); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061
(1983); N.Y. RULE 550.17; N.D. CENT. CODE R., App. P. 47; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 §§
1601-13; OR. REv. STAT. §§ 28.200-.255 (1984); W. VA. CODE §§ 51-1A-1 to -A-12 (1981); Wis.
STAT. AN. § 821.01 (1983); P.R. R. Civ. P. 53.1(C). The Delaware Supreme Court will answer
questions certified to it by other Delaware courts and the federal district court of Delaware,
but will not accept certified questions from federal appellate courts. DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41. This
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tions and has been frequently approved of by commentators 7 and the
Supreme Court alike." However, while certification may obviate the need
for judicial guesswork, it may also be viewed as frustrating the constitutional
grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts.9
Although there is some disagreement as to whether certification is simply
another abstention doctrine or whether it is more properly viewed as a way
to implement an abstention decision, 90 certification has, nonetheless, been
employed in two principal areas. First, where a case filed in federal court
raises a constitutional question and a decision could be premised instead on
state law grounds, as in the Pullman abstention category, 91 a federal court
might certify the state law question and hope to obtain an answer which
avoids a needless constitutional determination. In fact, because of the pro-
cedural advantages it has over Pullman abstention (there is less delay and
expense because the question goes straight to the state's highest court),
certification might appear more attractive to a federal court than traditional
Pullman abstention. 92 In contrast, however, to the use of certification in
Pullman-type circumstances, certification is not a viable alternative in Burfor?93
"conspicuous omission" was not unintended. FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 599
F. Supp. 684, 687 (D.Del. 1984).
87. See generally Note, Law/Fact Distinction, supra note 83, at 162 n.37, for an extensive
list of articles. See also LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certf/ication Experience,
19 GA. L. Rv. 999 (1985) (examining jurisprudential ideas involved in the "other'law" problem;
where one court asks a court of another system to answer question of that system's laws);
Butzner & Kelly, Fourth Circuit Review, Foreword: Certification: Assuring the Primacy of
State Law in The Fourth Circuit, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 449 (1985) (noting advantages of
certification). Cf. Kramer, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment
at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 227, 233 (1984) (momentum for enactment
of certification rules has died away).
88. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 636 (1988) (certifying to
Virginia Supreme Court two questions concerning interpretation of statute). "Certification, in
contrast to the more cumbersome and.., problematic abstention doctrine" is more expeditious.
Id. at 644. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (district court should certify question
of state abortion consent statute); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974) (when
certification is unavailable, federal court can remit parties to state court to resolve critical state
law issues); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960) (even where certification is
unavailable, Supreme Court has sought state determination of state law). Ironically, Justice
Douglas, author of the unanimous Court opinion in Lehman, had earlier opposed certification
in Clay. 363 U.S. 207, 227-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. U.S. CoNsT ART. III, § 2. Certification may afford an end-run around the policy of
providing a neutral forum for interstate dispute resolution and avoiding bias by state courts in
favor of their own citizens. Note, Law/Fact Distinction, supra note 83 at 164.
90. E.g., LeBel, supra note 16 at 1002 n.13 (1985); Wuowrr & MILLR, supra note 16, at §
4241.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
92. See, e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-
51 (1976); Griffin Hosp. v. Commission on Hosps., 782 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1986). Cf. Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part II), 36 U. Cm. L. Ray. 268, 317
(1969) (abstention has "a Bleak House [as in Jarndyce v. Jarndyce] aspect that in my mind is
too high a price to pay for the gains in avoiding error, friction, and constitutional questions").
93. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
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or Colorado River94 abstention situations because such cases do not turn on
an ambiguity in applicable state law. Second, certification is available in
private law actions based on diversity jurisdiction.9" In this situation, the
state's highest court resolves an unsettled state law question posed to it by
the federal court," thus simplifying the court's Erie task-the ascertainment
of unclear state law.9
The availability of certification to a federal court does not, of course,
assure its use. The use of certification procedures "rests in the sound
discretion of the federal courts. '"9 As such, courts weigh a number of factors
in determining the propriety of certification. The most crucial factors are
the "'added delay and expense' which may result when litigants are shuttled
from one courthouse to another and sometimes back again." 99 Certification
does impose "inevitable delay";100 more time elapses, and perforce more
expenditure is involved in terms of lawyer's fees and court costs than would
occur in "an ordinary decision of the state question on the merits by the
federal court."''1
Also to be considered is the burden, not only on litigants, but also on the
state's judiciary. While certification will always impose an additional burden
on state courts, the potential increase in a state supreme court's workload
is even higher in those states which permit certification not only from the
United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeal, but also from
federal district courts. 02 For example, almost one-quarter of all civil cases
filed in the year ending June 30, 1985 were based on diversity jurisdiction,
and many of the remaining civil cases raised pendent state claims or otherwise
94. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
95. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207 (1960).
96. The federal court asking for clarification of state law may be a district court or an
appellate court. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
97. E.g., Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. AVCO Corp., 804 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1986); Dixon
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 422, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1986) (Winter, J., dissenting);
Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 794 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986); Toner for Toner v. Lederle
Laboratories, 779 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 764 F.2d
876 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Manookian v. A.H. Robins Co., 760 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1985); Hume v.
Hertz Corp., 628 F. Supp. 763 (D. Conn. 1986).
98. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
99. L. Cohen & Co., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1419, 1421 (D. Conn.
1986) (citing County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1959)). Judge
Cabranes' decision not to certify two questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court is preceded
by a thoughtful analysis of the impact of the use of the then new Connecticut certification
procedure. 629 F. Supp. at 1422-23.
100. American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann, 683 F.2d 999, 1002 (6th Cer. 1982)
(denying certification where state statute must be interpreted in light of federal statute).
101. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). This
observation was previously made by Justice Black, dissenting in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207, 224-27 (1960).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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required ascertainment of state law. 03 If, for example, a Connecticut federal
court, and indeed federal courts from other states, invoke the certificate
process whenever faced with an unsettled question of Connecticut law, an
"unreasonable and unnecessary burden" would be imposed on the Connec-
ticut Supreme Court.' 0 Given the ramifications of frequent certification use,
the very rationale of certification, comity and federalism, would be seriously
thwarted by its overuse.' 5
Because of the additional delay and expense associated with certification
and the constitutional mandate to adjudicate,' 6 courts frequently examine
the extent of the putatively "unsettled" state law, which is also known as
determining the "closeness of the question."' . This examination takes all
relevant factors into account, including the availability of the resources that
would assist the judge in resolving the issue.' 0 Implicit, if not explicit, in
this inquiry as to whether the state law is really so unclear, is the perceived
competence of the federal judiciary to make the requisite Erie determination
without resort to certification. '09 It has even been suggested that Erie requires
federal courts to use independent reasoning in searching for the substantive
law that the state's highest court would apply," 0 emphasizing that federal
courts should and do play a large role in the evolution of common law."'
C. Certification and the Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit's experience with certification is illustrative. Each of
the states which comprise the Seventh Circuit has a certification procedure.
103. L. Cohen & Co., Inc., 629 F. Supp. at 1422 (citing ANNUAL REPORT OF Ta DIRECTOR
op THE ADmIm &TR vE OFmICE OF Tm U. S. COURTS (1986)).
104. Id. at 1423 & n.2.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
107. See e.g., Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976). See also Dixon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 422,
423 (4th Cir. 1986) (certification desirable in "appropriate circumstances" but may delay
resolution of cases and burden courts) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v.
Bruce Miner Co., 757 F.2d 440, 443 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985) (despite its availability, certification
should not be used if course adopted by state courts is clear); Harris v. Karri-On Campers,
Inc., 640 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir. 1981) (in exercising discretion to certify, court should consider
costs to, and delay for, litigants); Marston v. Red River Levee & Drainage Dist., 632 F.2d 466,
468 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (if at all possible, case should be resolved without certification).
108. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 395 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
109. See, e.g., L. Cohen & Co., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1419, 1425
(D. Conn. 1986) (federal courts should certify only those unusual questions that are particularly
suitable for certification).
110. See Kramer, supra, note 87, at 232.
111. Id. at 263. See also Landis & Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity
Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 372, 386 (1980) (discussing role of federal courts in shaping
common law). In this context, it is interesting to note that throughout the last 25 years, a
plaintiff has had a better chance of stating a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental
distress if the suit is riled in federal rather than state court. Sabin, Intentional Infliction of
Mental Distress-25 Years Later, 76 ILL. B.J. 864 (1987). In some 38 percent of the federal
cases, the court found that a cause of action had been stated under Illinois law; in state court,
only 10 percent of the plaintiffs passed that test. Id. at 866-67.
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Illinois adopted certification in 1983, permitting certification from the United
States Supreme Court and federal appellate courts, but not from federal
district courts."12 Wisconsin's certification procedure, also adopted in 1983,
allows the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide an unsettled question of state
law upon request of the United States Supreme Court, the United States
Courts of Appeal, or the highest appellate court of another state.", Like
Illinois, the Indiana certification procedure permits certification only from
the United States Supreme Court or federal appellate courts.", Thus, certi-
fication to these states' supreme courts is unavailable to any federal district
court, whether sitting in Illinois or elsewhere. Moreover, it is to these states
that district courts in the Seventh Circuit would most likely need to certify
a question.
Since 1982, the issue of certification has been presented to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in about a dozen cases with varying results. In
almost 75 percent of the cases in which one of the parties requested certi-
fication, the Seventh Circuit declined to certify the question to the relevant
state supreme court." 5 Despite the lack of controlling state supreme court
precedent in these cases, the Seventh Circuit found either that there was
sufficient precedent to determine how the state's supreme court would rule
on the issue;" 6 or that the allegedly murky state law was not so unsettled as
to justify the use of certification." 7 The Seventh Circuit's general reluctance
to certify has been echoed by other courts."'
112. ILL. S. CT. R. 20.
113. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 821.01-.12 (West 1987).
114. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-2-4-1 (Bums 1985).
115. E.g., Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc., 823 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Wisconsin); Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., Inc., 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987) (Indiana);
Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 794 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1986) (Illinois); Schaefer v. Heckler,
792 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1986) (Wisconsin); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on
May 15, 1979, 771 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois); Fromm v. Rosewell, 771 F.2d 1089 (7th
Cir. 1985) (Illinois), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986); Katapodis v. Koppers Co., Inc., 770
F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985) (Indiana). See also Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1325 (7th Cir.
1985) (Wisconsin) (although certification could be "an attractive route," case did not rest on
issue plaintiff wished to be certified); Spearing v. National Iron Co., 770 F.2d 87, 89 (7th Cir.
1985) (Wisconsin) (court inclined to certify but defendants failed to argue point of law); Estate
of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1073 (7th Cir. 1984) (Illinois) (certification would be
superfluous); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1207 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Illinois) (certification denied in light of state court decision).
116. Toro Co., 827 F.2d at 160; Katapodis, 770 F.2d at 660.
117. Smith, 823 F.2d at 1195 n.3; Country Mut. Ins. Co., 794 F.2d at 1214. See also Schaefer
v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 81, 84 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) (because issue can be resolved by reference to
statutory and case law, motion for certification denied).
118. E.g. Boyster v. C.I.R. Serv., 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 n.5 (4th Cir. 1981); Brewer v.
Memphis Pub. Co. Inc., 626 F.2d 1238, 1242 n.5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1980).
See also Roth, Certified Questions from the Federal Courts, Review and Re-proposal, 34 U.
M n L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1979) (Florida Supreme Court's enormous caseload, resulting in lengthy
delays of certification process, has made Fifth Circuit reluctant to certify state law questions).
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Since 1982, however, the Seventh Circuit has, in four cases, certified
questions of state law to the state's highest court." 9 The results have varied;
the Wisconsin and Indiana Supreme Courts have exhibited greater judicial
hospitality than the Illinois Supreme Court. For example, in In re Sandy
Ridge Oil Co., the Seventh Circuit asked, 20 and received an affirmative
answer 21 to, the question of whether a mortgage recorded in violation of
the Indiana Code serves as constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser.'2
Notably, the state law issued raised in Sandy Ridge was determinative of
the bankruptcy appeal.'23 In Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co.,' 2' after the
Seventh Circuit certified the question, the Indiana Supreme Court held that
the Indiana statute allowing treble damages for reckless, knowing or inten-
tional destruction of property did not apply to wrongful death actions . 2 5
The Seventh Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court decision based
on the Indiana Supreme Court's answer.'2 In Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 27
another diversity case, the Seventh Circuit asked the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to determine when a cause of action accrues under Wisconsin's statute
of limitation for personal injury actions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
furnished the answer, and the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the defendant manufacturer. 2 Like the
Seventh Circuit's experiences in Hansen, Kuba, and Sandy Ridge, other
jurisdictions have successfully employed certification. 29
In contrast, on the sole occasion where the Seventh Circuit has certified
a question of state law to the Illinois Supreme Court, that court tersely
119. Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co., 811 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1987); (Indiana); In re Sandy
Ridge Oil Co., 807 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986) (Indiana); Citizens for John W. Moore Party v.
Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 781 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1986) (Illinois); Hansen v. A.
H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1983) (Wisconsin). See also Collins, Co., v. Carboline
Co., 837 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1988) (certifying to Illinois Supreme Court whether, in absence
of contractual privity, express warranty extends to assignee's right to economic and consequential
damages).
120. In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., 807 F.2d at 1338.
121. In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., Inc. 510 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. 1987).
122. In re Sandy Ridge Oil Co., Inc., 832 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1987) (subsequent opinion
applying state supreme court's answer).
123. See supra note 24.
124. 811 F.2d 1053 (7th Ci. 1987).
125. 508 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1987).
126. 822 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987) (mem.).
127. 715 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 1267.
129. See, e.g., Adams v. Murphy, 598 F.2d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1979) (question certified), 394
So. 2d 411 (Fla.) (answer to question certified), 653 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1981) (subsequent
opinion), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982). But see Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F.2d 100,
104 (5th Cir. 1983) (question certified), 437 So.2d 46 (Miss. 1983) (court declined to answer
question because not necessary and no great public interest involved), 719 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1983) (subsequent opinion).
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refused, without explanation, to answer the question which was posed. 3 0
The refusal of the Illinois court, a reaction echoed by courts in other states,'
undermines the certification procedure which the state court itself has prom-
ulgated and disserves the principle of federalism which underlie certification.
Of course, if a state court refuses to accept a certified question, comity can
hardly be said to be at issue. Having been asked to dance, and having
refused, the state court cannot complain of being a wallflower.
If the Seventh Circuit experience is typical, with its infrequent use of
certification and the lack of success in at least one case where the Seventh
Circuit did certify the question, certification is not the cure-all for Erie
ascertainment ills. In any event, many federal district court judges, including
Judges Marshall and Shadur, cannot refer questions of unclear state law to
their respective state supreme courts. ,32 Thus, despite our detour through the
highways and byways of abstention and certification, federal judges are still
often faced with the dilemma of ascertaining state law-the "Diogenes-
like"'3 quest.
II. ASCERTAINING STATE LAW: THE INTRA-STATE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT OF
STATE LAW AND THE IMPACT OF Klaxon 34
It may be helpful here to recapitulate the gist of the discussion up to this
point. Erie teaches that in diversity cases a federal court is to apply the
substantive law of the forum state to substantive issues.'35 Klaxon includes
a state's conflict of laws within the realm of substantive law. 3 6 It is also
clear that Erie's mandate impinges in areas of pendent and federal question,
as well as diversity, jurisdiction.3 7 Where a federal judge chooses neither
abstention'38 nor certification'39 as a method of determining the "other law"
question, the judge is necessarily left to determine the substantive law of the
forum. In the absence of a recent and/or viable decision by the state's
highest court, the federal judge may look to many sources in order to
ascertain the state's law, such as the state appellate court's decisions and
recent trends within and without the jurisdiction. It has been suggested, as
130. Citizens for John W. Moore Party v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 781 F.2d
581 (7th Cir. 1986) (question certified), 487 N.E.2d 946, 94 Ill. Dec. 69 (1986) (refusal to
answer question), 794 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1986) (subsequent opinion).
131. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1986),
cert denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Jones v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 519, 520 (4th Cir. 1985); WXVC,
Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420, 422 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Thompson v. Ramirez, 597 F. Supp.
730, 732 (D.P.R. 1984) (Supreme Court refused to answer jurisdictional question).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
133. Vestal, The Certified Question of Law, 36 IOWA L. Rav. 629, 644 (1951).
134. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
135. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See also supra note 12.
136. 313 U.S. at 496.
137. See also supra note 22.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 43-77.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 78-110.
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well, that federal judges also examine the judicial zeitgeist, i.e., the inherent
activism or restraint, of the state's highest court judges in determining first
impression issues.' 40
Judges Shadur and Marshall, however, differ dramatically as to the role
conflicting state appellate court decisions should play in the ascertainment
of state law. Judge Marshall adopts the now "classic" Erie predictive
approach.41 Judge Shadur, recently joined by Judge Leinenweber, adopts
an "internal choice of law" approach." 42 In discrete situations, the internal
choice of law approach requires, according to Judge Shadur, that each state
trial court, and hence each federal trial court in a diversity case, be bound
to follow the decisions of the appellate court in its own district when the
appellate districts diverge." 43 To understand Judge Shadur's approach, it is
necessary to examine the nature of the Illinois judicial system and the impact
of Klaxon.
A. The Appellate Courts of Illinois
Illinois has had intermediate appellate courts for more than 100 years.'"
The Illinois constitution vests judicial power "in a Supreme court, an
Appellate Court and Circuit courts, ' "45 and provides "five judicial Districts
for the selection of Supreme and Appellate Court Judges."'14 The Illinois
constitution denotes the boundaries of the first judicial district as Cook
County"47 (note that the Dirksen Federal Building, which houses the courts
of the Northern District of Illinois, is also in Cook County) and delegates
to the legislature the power, with only some geographical limitations, to
determine the boundaries of the other four districts.'" In spite of the
unambiguous language concerning the unitary nature of the Illinois Appellate
court ("an Appellate Court") and the division into five districts for conven-
ience ("for the selection of ... judges"), the Illinois judiciary has long
assumed that the five appellate court districts are co-equal but distinct,
140. See Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope of
Inquiry, 53 MNN. L. REv. 806, 820-23 (1969).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
142. See supra text accompanying note 30. For an example of Judge Leinenweber's concur-
rence with Judge Shadur, see Cresswell v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., No. 85 C 5822, slip op. at
nn.3 & 4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1986).
143. Zakarian v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 652 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 & n.19 (N.D. III.
1987).
144. Mattis & Kalowitz, supra note 25, at 571.
145. ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § I (emphasis added).
146. IL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added). Each of districts three to five are comprised
of a single division; the first district has five divisions; the second district has two divisions.
IL. Sup. CT. R. 22(a); IL. Rev. STAT. ch. I 1A, 22(a) (1987).
147. Ill. Const. art. VI, § 2.
148. Id. The Illinois legislature has delineated the boundaries of appellate districts two to
five. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, 1.2-.5 (1987).
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reigning over their respective geographic territories as independent judicial
sovereigns. 4 9 The stare decisis effect of this arrangement is that while all
the appellate court districts are of course bound by decisions of the Illinois
Supreme Court, each appellate district may, with stare decisis impunity,
reach different results upon the same issue.
This multiplicity of voices heard on a single question, which furnishes the
basis for much of the Erie controversy among federal judges within the
Northern District of Illinois, is dramatically illustrated by a specific group
of Illinois cases. The issue presented in these cases was whether Illinois
common law permits an injured person or entity to maintain a claim against
an insurer for its bad faith handling of an insurance claim. 50 An Illinois
statute provided for an award of attorney's fees, costs, and a limited penalty
upon a showing that the insurer acted vexatiously and unreasonably in
connection with an insurance claim.' Illinois appellate courts in the first
5 2
and third districts' held that the Illinois statute precluded any common law
recovery based on the insurer's bad faith. In contrast, the fifth district held
that an independent cause of action existed, 'm and the second district held
that the Illinois statute barred common law punitive damages against an
insurer, but did not limit recovery of compensatory damages.'
The resulting divergence within the Northern District is thus expectable
and interesting. Most of the federal decisions reach the same result as that
espoused by the First District. 56 Judge Shadur employs a different means
to reach the same result; he feels bound under the internal choice of law
rule to follow decisions of the First District Appellate Court.'" Judge
149. See Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 25, at 573, 578-81. The authors further note that
the divisions of each district (five in the first; two in the second) may sit in any district in the
state. Such interchangeability also indicates a single appellate court in Illinois. Id. at 579-80.
150. See Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 538 (N.D. Il1. 1983).
151. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, 767 (1987).
152. Hamilton v. Safeway Ins. Co., 104 11. App. 3d 353, 432 N.E.2d 996 (1st Dist. 1982);
Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1st Dist. 1979).
153. Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 11. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
154. Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan, 29 INI. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 338, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976). See also Lynch v. Mid-America
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 94 Ill. App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (4th Dist. 1981) (following
Ledingham as to the viability of common law tort for breach of duty to handle insurance claim
in good faith).
155. Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980).
156. See, e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 550 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(Moran, J.); Strader v. Union Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Aspen, J.); Hyler
v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 79 C 2507 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1982) (Grady, J.); Henke v. Travelers
Ins. Co., No. 80 C 5068 (N.D. I1. Oct. 21, 1981) (Moran, J.). See generally Durham, Section
767 of the Illinois Insurance Code: Does It Preempt Tort Liability?, 16 J. MAtsRA1L L. REv.
471 (1983) (survey of Illinois court decisions); Alexander, Punitive Damages in Illinois Insurance
Cases-Beyond Ledingham, Debolt, and Kelsay, 70 ILL. B.J. 645 (1982) (survey of Illinois case
law and comparison to other jurisdictions).
157. Abbott Laboratories v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. 111. 1983). See
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Marshall reaches a result different from that of the First District Appellate
Court and Judge Shadur by employing the state supreme court predictive
approach to the Erie problem posed by the split of authority in the Illinois
appellate courts.'5 8 It is both ironic and yet endemic to the predictive ap-
proach that other judges have reached the First District's (and Judge Shad-
ur's) result by the "predictive" method employed by Judge Marshall, thus
disagreeing with his "prediction." These judges believe that the first district
conclusion would be adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court if faced with
identical circumstances.5 9
B. Of Illinois Trial Courts: State and Federal
1. Illinois trial courts
Although at least one state court judge '60 and several commentators 6 have
deplored the stare decisis nightmare resulting from the view of Illinois
also Zakarian v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 652 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (federal court
compelled to follow only First District Appellate Court decisions on pre-emptive effect of
Illinois statute).
158. Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 542 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(in presence of divergent state decisions, Judge Marshall predicted state supreme court would
allow punitive damages claim); Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Il. 1982) (First
District decision not necessarily controlling because plaintiff could have filed in any Illinois
county).
159. See, e.g., American Dental Ass'n v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 625
F. Supp. 364, 366-67 (N.D. 11. 1985) (Plunkett, J); UNR Industries, Inc. v. Continental Ins.
Co., 607 F. Supp. 855, 863-68 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Hart, J); Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
550 F. Supp. 896, 900 (N.D. II1. 1982) (Moran, J.); Strader v. Union Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp.
159, 161-62 (N. D. Ill. 1980) (Aspen, J.).
In a similar vein, decisions of the Northern District of Illinois have reflected the split in
Illinois appellate courts concerning whether an employee manual or handbook can create
enforceable contractual rights. Compare Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 II. App.
3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979) (refusing to allow personnel policies to serve as bases
for breach of contract actions) with Kaiser v. Dixon, 127 Il1. App. 3d 251, 468 N.E.2d 822 (2d
Dist. 1984) (rejecting Sargent and holding that employer is bound to policy manual terms when
manual imposes obligations on both employee and employer). The split within the state courts
is reflected in federal district court decisions. Compare Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984) and Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 560 F. Supp.
619 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (both cases following Sargent) with Pelizza v. Reader's Digest Sales &
Serv. Inc., 624 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. I11. 1985); Kufalk v. Hart, 610 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ill.
1985) and Pudil v. Smart Buy, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (all cases following
Kaiser).
In none of these cases did the federal judge employ Judge Shadur's "internal choice of law"
formula. Instead, the Court attempted to predict, on the basis of "trends" or the "better
reasoned" approach, the probable holding of the Illinois Supreme Court. Of course, federal
courts sometimes make incorrect predictions as to undecided questions of state law. See Collins
Co. v. Carboline Co., 837 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting Enis, holding that employee
manual does not create enforceable contract rights, and subsequent Illinois Supreme Court
holding to the contrary in Duldiulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482,
505 N.E.2d 314 (1987)). This inherent Erie problem makes certification an attractive alternative.
Collins, 837 F.2d at 303.
160. Cornue v. Weaver, 29 IIl. App. 3d 546, 553 n.l, 331 N.E.2d 148, 154 (lst Dist. 1975)
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appellate courts as a non-unitary system, the following rules drawn from
two seminal state appellate court decisions appear to be reasonably well
settled. As articulated in Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc.,162 an
Illinois state trial court, "located in an appellate district where a conclusion
on an issue is reached, should adhere to that conclusion and not to one
promulgated in another district. ' 16 People v. Thorpe,'" however, modified
the Garcia rule somewhat by holding that if only one appellate court district
has decided the specific issue, and the Illinois state trial court is located in
another appellate district, the trial court is bound by that decision: "[T]he
decisions of an appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts
regardless of locale."'d With little guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court,
the stare decisis effect on state trial courts of appellate court decisions has
thus been left to the Thorpe/Garcia rules'" and to the appellate courts
themselves. 167
As noted earlier,'" Illinois is one of 37 states which have a tri-level judicial
system and one of 15 states which have more than one intermediate appellate
court. The intra-state precedential approach espoused by the Illinois appellate
courts is not employed in all 15 states. For instance, in Oklahoma, appellate
court decisions lacking approval by a majority of the Justices of the Okla-
homa Supreme Court for publication in the official reporter do not carry
precedential weight. Thus, a federal court sitting in diversity is not obliged
to follow Oklahoma appellate court decisions. 69 However, the Oklahoma
"precedentless" approach appears to be unique. 70
2. Federal trial courts
When Judge Shadur initially espoused the view that he was obligated to
adhere to legal principles enunciated by the First District Appellate Court
("Absent compelling differences of controlling precedent to the contrary, the decision of another
appellate division should be followed"), rev'd on other grounds sub. nor. Cornue v. Department
of Pub. Aid, 64 Ill. 2d 78, 354 N.E.2d 359 (1976). Before his appointment to the Northern
District of Illinois federal bench, Judge Leighton, the author of Cornue, served as a First
District Appellate Court judge.
161. See Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 25, at 595.
162. 29 Ill. App. 3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634 (1975).
163. Id. at 482, 331 N.E.2d at 636. Accord Bradshaw v. Pellican, 152 Ill. App. 3d 253, 258,
504 N.E.2d 211, 216 (1987); People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill. App. 3d 576, 579, 367 N.E.2d 960, 963
(1977). For a similar rule outside Illinois, see Senor T's Restaurant v. Industrial Comm'n, 641
P.2d 877, 882 (Ariz. App. 1981) (Froeb, J., specially concurring).
164. 52 11. App. 3d 576, 367 N.E.2d 960 (1977).
165. Id. at 579, 367 N.E.2d at 963. See also State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 52-53 (Fla. App.
1976) (trial courts must follow higher court holdings).
166. See Thorpe, 52 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 367 N.E. 2d at 963; Garcia, 29 I1. App. 3d at 482,
331 N.E.2d at 636.
167. Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 25, at 583.
168. See supra note 25.
169. Russell v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 11, 113 (E.D. Okla. 1976). But cf.
American Triticale Inc. v. Nytco Services, Inc., 664 F.2d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 1981) (Oklahoma's
state law is applicable when analogous Oklahoma appellate court decision is dispositive).
170. Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 25, at 596.
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"just as a Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County would,"' 7' he did so
without reference to the Thorpe/Garcia rule of stare decisis. 172 At the time
of Judge Shadur's internal choice of law pronouncement, a decision of the
first district appellate court decision was apparently the only Illinois case on
point. Judge Shadur's rationale for giving the decision determinative weight
was the Supreme Court's decision in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field.'73
Although the "extreme applications"'' of the Erie doctrine, as typified by
Fidelity Union and the other "311" cases,'7 were questionable, the assump-
tion of Fidelity Union was not: there should not be one rule for litigants in
state courts and another rule for litigants in federal courts. 176
Shortly after Judge Shadur enunciated his internal choice of law rule, he
was confronted with an issue upon which the Illinois appellate courts disa-
greed. In Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 7 Judge Shadur felt
"obligated," under the Thorpe/Garcia rule, to follow the First District
Appellate Court. 78 Only when there is a conflict within the divisions of the
Illinois first appellate district 79 does Judge Shadur believe that Erie requires
a predictive approach to ascertain Illinois law. 18 Accepting the correctness
of Judge Shadur's general rule, however, one could question whether the
logic of his position would not be served more consistently by applying the
law of that division where venue would have been proper if the case had
been filed in state court. Judge Shadur also employs the predictive method
171. National Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F. Supp. 147, 148-49 & n.2 (N.D. Ill.
1981). Resolving the same issue by employing a predictive approach, the Third Circuit previously
rejected claims for economic loss in a tort context. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law).
172. People v. Thorpe, 52 Ill. App. 3d 576, 367 N.E.2d 960 (1977); Garcia v. Hynes &
Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Il. App. 3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634 (1975) (where appellate court
decisions conflict, circuit court should follow decision of appellate court within its district). See
supra text accompanying notes 161-64. As to whether the Thorpe/Garcia rule of stare decisis
is really the same conceptual animal contemplated by Klaxon, see infra text accompanying
notes 217-34.
173. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
174.. National Can, 505 F. Supp. at 148 n.2.
175. The "excesses of 311," Supreme Court decisions in volume 311 of United States Reports,
are discussed at supra note 21.
176. National Can, 505 F. Supp. at 148 n.2 (quoting Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311
U.S. 169, 180 (1940)).
177. 509 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
178- Id. at 339 & n.4.
179. As of 1987, there were 21 judges sitting in the five divisions of the first district. See
CHICAGO LAWYER, JUDICIAL DIRECTORY (1987).
180. Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Il. 1981). A conflict between two First
District decisions leaves the federal judge "free to choose the most likely result before the
Illinois Supreme Court" by looking at how it decided related cases. Id. at 563. See also
Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841, 845 n.6 (N.D. 111. 1982) (rejecting as
"wooden in the extreme" defendant's request that, given a split within the First District, the
Court should follow the "most recent" First District decision). One can nonetheless question
where the logic of Judge Shadur's position should lead him.
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when there is neither an "Illinois case in point" nor "any significant Illinois
precedent,""8 ' and where a state court plaintiff could have sued in two
different appellate court districts, but instead sues in the Northern District
of Illinois federal court.8 2
In three decisions, Judge Shadur has written what is, at first blush, a
persuasive apologia for the "internal choice of law approach."' 83 This method
seems to be uniquely his own, although a few decisions in other jurisdictions
have articulated similar concerns.&4 Based on the "holy" trinity of Erie,
Guaranty Trust v. York,"' and Klaxon, Judge Shadur reasons as follows:
(1) Erie requires federal courts to apply state substantive law in disputes
between diversity-of-citizenship adversaries so as to avoid unequal protec-
tion of the law and to provide uniformity in the administration of laws;"'
(2) York teaches "that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by
a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block
away should not lead to a substantially different result'';'
(3) Klaxon says that choice-of-law rules are substantive for Erie purposes,
"[o]therwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly
disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal
courts sitting side by side";'
(4) Therefore, Judge Shadur concludes that the Thorpe/Garcia rule is just
as binding on a federal court in Illinois "as any other Illinois choice-of-
law, or other substantive law, rule."' 9
181. Zawadzki v. Checker Taxi Co., 539 F. Supp. 207, 208 (N.D. IlI. 1982).
182. Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. at 850 n.3.
183. Rizzo v. Means Serv., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115, 1131-32 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Abbott
Laboratories v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193, 197-200 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Commercial
Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841, 847-52 (N.D. I1. 1982).
184. Extensive research has disclosed only two cases in which other federal judges perceive
their Erie role as somewhat akin to Judge Shadur's view. In People's Bank of Polk County v.
Roberts, 779 F.2d 1544, 1545-46 (1lth Cir. 1986) (per curiam), the court was faced with
conflicting intermediate state court decisions. The court chose Florida's Second District Court
of Appeals holding over the Third District holding because (1) there was no indication the
Florida Supreme Court would decide the issue otherwise; and (2) it was the law that would
have been applied .'in the specific courts available to plaintiff in the state system."' Id. at
1546 (emphasis added) (quoting Farmer v. Travelers Indem. Co., 539 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir.
1976)). In Farmer, the Fifth Circuit refused to certify to the Florida Supreme Court a question
decided by the Second District Court of Appeal, but not by all Florida district courts of appeal.
The federal court noted that if the plaintiff had filed a state action, the matter "would have
been reviewed by the Second District. Undoubtedly the trial court and the Second District
would have followed the recent Second District opinion. Thus, the same law has been applied
in federal court as would have been applied in the specific courts available to plaintiff in the
state system." Id. at 563. When plaintiff chooses a federal forum, she should not be able to
attract the immediate attention of the Florida Supreme Court, via the Fifth Circuit, to issues
which the Florida Supreme Court has chosen not to accept from state litigants. Id.
185. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
186. Abbott Laboratories v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193, 197 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
187. Id. (quoting Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
188. 573 F. Supp. at 197 (quoting Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941)).
189. 573 F. Supp. at 197.
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Whether Judge Shadur is correct-whether Erie and its progeny have taken
us so far-is problematic. Judge Marshall has questioned the internal choice
of law approach from several perspectives. 90 There are, in addition, several
other concerns raised by Judge Shadur's formula. Can Klaxon's mandate be
said to include the Thorpe/Garcia situation which involves, after all, a rule
of stare decisis addressed to state courts? Even if we accept Judge Shadur's
general notion of evenhandedness as between a federal and state court sitting
in the same geographical location, why should Judge Shadur follow a holding
of the Illinois Second and Third Appellate Court Districts (Thorpe/Garcia)
in situations where, under his own formula, the law of the First Appellate
Court District should be applicable? These and other questions will be
addressed in the next section.
C. "Appellate Court Adherence":'9 A Critique
The most fundamental difference between the Shadur approach and Mar-
shall's "Supreme-Court-prediction"' 9" concerns the weight to be afforded
decisions of an intermediate state appellate court. This distinction, it would
seem, pertains to whether a state appellate court has enunciated an "internal"
rule of substantive law (e.g., the Illinois Insurance Code preempts a plaintiff's
right to recover punitive damages for an insurer's breach of its good faith
duty) 93 or has spoken in terms of stare decisis or what Judge Shadur terms
"choice of law" (e.g., when appellate courts differ, a state trial court is
bound by a decision of the appellate court in its own district)."4 Absent
guidance from the state's highest court, in certain situations'9" Judge Shadur
190. Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. I11. 1983) (Erie
requires federal court to apply law that would ultimately apply; "state trial court" approach
is incentive for forum shopping); Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Judge
Shadur's approach may require federal court to apply law which would not be used if plaintiff
filed in state court).
191. Rizzo v. Means Services, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
192. Id.
193. Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 Il. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1980). See
supra text accompanying notes 150-55.
194. People v. Thorpe, 52 11. App. 3d 576, 367 N.E.2d 960 (1977); Garcia v. Hynes &
Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 479, 331 N.E.2d 634 (1975). See supra text accom-
panying notes 160-65.
To students of Conflict of Laws, vocabulary terms such as "internal law," "choice of law,"
and "whole law," should raise the specter of renvoi-where the forum court not only looks
to the internal law of the relevant jurisdiction, but to its choice of law approach. See RESTATE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 8 (1934). Under the renvoi doctrine, the foreign jurisdiction's
choice of law may lead back to the law of the forum ("remission") or to that of a third state
("transmission"). See generally Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1166-70
(1938) (discussing four approaches to renvoi problems). See also In re Schneider's Estate, 198
Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1950) (reference to law of situs is to whole law, including its
conflicts of law rules).
195. Judge Shadur does not use the "appellate-court-adherence" approach when there is a
conflict within the appellate district, when there is no significant precedent, or when the plaintiff
could have sued in several Illinois counties. See supra text accompanying notes 176-80.
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would give determinative weight to both types of intermediate appellate
holdings. In contrast, Judge Marshall' 96 and the overwhelming weight of
authority' 97 suggest that appellate court decisions provide only data, not
determinative weight for ascertaining state law. Under Erie, if a federal court
is convinced that the state's highest court would decide otherwise, the federal
judge may disregard those appellate court decisions. There appears to be no
reason, based on logic or the Erie doctrine, to treat the intermediate court
decisions differently based upon whether they address "internal" law or
"choice-of-law." Judge Shadur, of course, does not. He gives both types
of decisions determinative weight. But it would seem clear that the great
number of courts which view the Erie mandate vis-a-vis "internal" decisions
of intermediate appellate court decisions as "data," or "evidence," or
"indicators"' ' 9 would similarly construe alleged "choice of law" decisions
of appellate courts, such as Thorpe and Garcia. In this regard it should be
noted that federal courts often do employ a predictive method to ascertain
whether a state's highest court would abandon the traditional, vested rights
approach to choice-of-law in favor of a modern approach. 199
196. See e.g., Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 645 (N.D. I11. 1982) (using predictive
approach).
197. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (if state's highest
court has not addressed issue, appellate court decisions not binding); West v. American Tel.
Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (federal court must have persuasive data to find that state
supreme court will not follow lower court's holdings); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Ger-beck
Mach. Co., 806 F.2d 1207, 1209 (3d Cir. 1986) (intermediate appellate court decisions must be
given "significant" weight); Green v. I.C. Penney Auto Ins. Co., 806 F.2d 759, 761, 765 (7th
Cir. 1986) (where Illinois appellate decisions conflict, court adopts "superior rule" enunciated
by Fifth District as that which the Illinois Supreme Court would adopt); Williams, McCarthy,
Kinley, Rudy & Picha v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Group, 750 F.2d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 1984)
(intermediate appellate court decision not binding evidence of state law where it is not a good
predictor of what state's highest court would do); McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
622 F.2d 657, 662 (3rd Cir. 1980) (federal courts should give "proper regard" but not
"conclusive effect" to decisions of lower state courts and may not be bound by intermediate
appellate court ruling), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980); Coleman v. Western Elec. Co., 671
F.2d 980, 983 (6th Cir. 1982) (state appellate court decision is an "Erie indicator" for
ascertaining state law).
198. See supra note 197.
199. See, e.g., Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (3d Cir.
1978) (based on intermediate state appellate court decision, federal court predicted that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt a new approach). Cf. Fry v. Lamb Rental Tools,
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. La. 1967) (refused to anticipate Louisiana's abandonment of the
place-of-wrong rule, despite appellate court dicta indicating such change).
Of course, a federal court may not "engraft onto those state [choice-of-law] rules exceptions
or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which have not
commended themselves to the state in which the federal court sits." Day & Zimmerman, Inc.
v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975). Cf. Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.
1970) (court used an interest analysis and applied Louisiana law although Louisiana had adhered
to traditional choice-of-law rule which pointed to foreign law). The Lester court side-stepped
Klaxon's mandate to follow the "conflict of laws rules prevailing in the forum state," 313 U.S.
487, 494 (1941), by noting that there was no conflict of laws present because only Louisiana
policy was implicated in the case. Lester, 433 F.2d at 889.
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The fundamental question still remains: Is Judge Shadur, who appears to
be a "voice crying in the wilderness," 200 correct in assuming that Erie and
its progeny require that intermediate appellate court decisions be given
determinative weight? 201 Professor Corbin observes that a federal court must
ascertain state law by examining "all the juristic data that are available to
the state court. If the federal judge is required to disregard some of those
available data [such as conflicting decisions of other appellate courts pursuant
to the Shadur approach], the litigant is not getting the same justice that he
would if the forum were a court of the state whose system of law is applicable
... ,, For Judge Shadur to be bound by a First District Appellate Court
decision when in his own scheme it is applicable might, in the words of one
commentator, "turn out to be more hazardous a course than boldly to try
to look into the womb of time and apply the law as it seems to be
developing. "20 3 Similarly, Judge Shadur's approach may be more hazardous
than predicting how the Illinois Supreme Court would decide a case involving
a state court litigant on subsequent appeal to the intermediate appellate court
and, finally, to that court. Erie requires only that a federal court apply the
law that "ultimately" would be applied had the case been litigated in a state
court." Judge Shadur's approach requires the assumption that no diversity
case brought in federal court, if brought in state court, would have reached
that state's highest court.2
200. For those very few decisions employing a similar analysis, see supra note 184.
201. At least in those situations where Judge Shadur deems it necessary. See supra text
accompanying notes 176-80.
202. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 774 (1941). Professor
Corbin's classic remarks continue:
When the rights of a litigant are dependent on the law of a particular state, the
court of the forum must do its best (not its worst) to determine what that law is.
It must use its judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot. Our judicial
process is not mere syllogistic deduction, except at its worst. At its best, it is the
wise and experienced use of many sources in combination-statutes, judicial opi-
nions, treatises, prevailing mores, custom, business practices; it is history and
economics and sociology, and logic, both inductive and deductive. Shall a litigant,
by the accident of diversity of citizenship, be deprived of the advantages of this
judicial process? Shall the Supreme Court, by what superficially appears to be an
unselfish and self-denying ordinance, foreclose the use of such a process by federal
judges? It is in fact a denial of justice to those for whom a court exists. We must
not forget that a litigant has only one day in court. When forced into a federal
court, that is his only court. If he is denied life, liberty, or property by the narrow
syllogistic use of a state judge's worded doctrine, he is not restored by the fact that
intelligent state judges later refuse to apply that doctrine to other litigants. True,
he has had his day in court; but what a court!
Id. at 775.
203. Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Deference to State Courts Versus Federal
Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. Rav. 419, 425 (1960) (citation omitted).
204. Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(mem.).
205. Id. at 543 n.15.
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On the other hand, Judge Shadur's method may achieve parity between state
and federal court outcomes in more cases than Judge Marshall's approach,
as few state court cases do reach the state supreme court.206
The Shadur approach, however, is flawed in an even more significant way.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario: Mr. and Mrs. Smith of Iowa
wish to have children. However, Mrs. Smith, after much testing, has been
found to be incapable of conceiving. The couple enters into a surrogacy
contract in Illinois with Mrs. Jones, an Illinois domiciliary. Upon the baby's
birth, Ms. Jones has a change of heart and decides to keep the child. The
Illinois Supreme Court has not yet addressed the validity of surrogacy
contracts. However, the court of the Fifth Appellate District has recently
declared such contracts to be valid and enforceable. The court of the First
Appellate District, where proper state venue lies, has not yet spoken. Fol-
lowing the Thorpe/Garcia doctrine, Judge Shadur tells us that a federal
court must give determinative weight to the Fifth District Appellate Court
decision.207 If plaintiff filed in the proper state court, the trial court presum-
ably would follow the fifth district holding. 208 But on appeal, the first district
might not do so, since decisions of a different district appellate court do
not have stare decisis effect in another district. 209 Moreover, given the cutting-
edge nature of the issue, it is highly possible that the first district might
reach a different conclusion. Thus, Mr, and Mrs. Smith, if they were wise
(and lucky enough to have the case assigned to Judge Shadur), would file
the case in federal court on the basis of diversity, thereby insuring that the
favorable rule enunciated by the fifth district would be applied and upheld
on appeal.2 10 This opportunity for intra-state forum-shopping between state
and federal court violates the very heart of Erie, as well as Klaxon. The
disuniformity between courts in a single state, forum-shopping "across the
courthouse square," may be more serious than disuniformity between federal
courts.
211
206. See Abbott Laboratories v. Granite St. Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193, 198 & n.5 (N.D.
III. 1983) ("Only a comparative handful of cases finds its way to the Illinois Supreme Court").
207. See, e.g., Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841, 848 (N.D. I1. 1982).
208. Under Thorpe and Garcia, in the absence of a conflicting decision by the appellate
court in which district the trial court sits, the decisions of other appellate courts are binding
authority. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
209. See supra text accompanying note 149.
210. See Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 540-41 (N.D. I11.
1983). As Judge Marshall notes, the same opportunity for forum-shopping is presented to a
defendant if by removal that party could obtain a more favorable rule of law. Id. at 541. The
underlying assumption of the hypothetical case is that Illinois law as to the validity and
enforceability of the contract would be held applicable either because of a choice of law clause
in the contract or because Illinois choice of law so indicates. See, e.g., Champagnie v. W.E.
O'Neil Constr. Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d 136, 395 N.E.2d 990 (1979) (to determine validity of
indemnity agreement Illinois employs the most significant relationship approach to choice of
law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1969).
211. See R. CRAMPTON, D. CuRREE, H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
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A related but different forum-shopping problem also stems from Judge
Shadur's approach; it requires federal courts to give more weight to state
appellate decisions than would the courts rendering those decisions . 2  Re-
turning to our prior hypothetical surrogate scenario, it is conceivable that
upon later reflection (i.e., consideration of current trends and more recent
national litigation) 2 3 the Fifth Appellate District Court might very well adopt
a wholly different conclusion. Clearly, that court is completely free to
reexamine its earlier holding and redefine the boundaries of that earlier
decision. It is exactly that judicial process in which Erie. contemplates a
federal court will engage, using "judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and
a paste pot. '1 14 If federal trial courts are permitted under Erie to disregard
a decision by a state's highest court if a developing line of authorities cast
doubt as to the continuing validity of the other decision,2 5 then surely federal
trial courts should not be more "bound" by intermediate appellate court
decisions.2t
6
Yet another troubling question raised by Judge Shadur's intermediate
appellate court adherence concerns his reading of Klaxon. Whether viewed
as the beloved, true progeny of Erie or unwanted bastard child, 2 7 Klaxon
813 (4th ed. 1987) (citing ALI, STUDY oF mE DIVIsxoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 158-59 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963)); Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law
Process and The Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 732, 742 (1963).
212. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 541.
213. The surrogate mother contract issue has engendered much controversy and commentary.
See, e.g., In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (state statutes and
public policy prohibit surrogate motherhood for money); Comment, Surrogate Motherhood:
Boon or Baby-selling: The Unresolved Questions, 71 MARQ. L. REv. 115 (1987). To date, only
a handful of state legislatures have passed laws dealing with surrogate motherhood: Arkansas
(ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1987)) (allowing surrogacy); Nevada (1987 NEV. STAT. 773)
(same)), and Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2713 (West 1988) (surrogacy contracts "absolutely
null" and void as against public policy). See Chicago Daily L. Bul., Feb. 5, 1988, at 3, col. 2.
See also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrili 1987) (requiring mother's
consent to adoption regardless of her decision prior to child's birth).
214. See Corbin, supra note 200, at 774.
215. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956).
216. Cf Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 544 & n.18 (N.D.
111. 1983) (comparing state intermediate appellate decision "reached without consideration of a
critically important datum of state law" to early state supreme court precedents on brink of
being overruled).
217. Klaxon has been criticized on several grounds by a number of commentators. See, e.g.,
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 593, 597, 612 (3d ed. 1986) (Klaxon
could be overruled under due process bar by state merely labeling its own rule as "procedural");
C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 67-70 (4th ed. 1983) (Klaxon allows forum-shopping among state
and deprives federal courts of power to develop conflict of laws doctrine); Horowitz, Toward
a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. REv. 1191 (1967) (federal system
means states should not have automony to resolve conflicts with other states' law.s); Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963) (federal courts should
resolve conflicts issues). Moreover, there is an ever-increasing chorus demanding its retraction
at least as to choice of law decisions in tort cases. See, e.g., Atwood, The Choice-of-Law
Dilemma in Mass Tort Litigation: Kicking Around Erie, Klaxon, and Van Dusen, 19 CONN.
19891
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
is with us. But as will be seen, not even the broadest reading of Klaxon
suggests that it embraces the stare decisis effect of decisions like Thorpe and
Garcia on federal-as opposed to state-courts.
First, Thorpe and Garcia clearly and explicitly addressed their comments
to state, not federal, courts.218 It would be both unprecedented and without
constitutional authority for a state court to require that federal courts be
bound by certain intermediate state court decisions. Erie does not go so far.
Under Judge Shadur's approach, federal courts will not only encourage
forum-shopping "'across the courthouse square," 219 but forum-shopping among
federal courts located in Illinois. Sitting in different state appellate court
districts, these federal courts would be obligated to follow decisions of that
particular appellate court district. Moreover, Judge Shadur's approach cre-
ates uncertainty with respect to decisions of federal courts outside of Illinois.
While Judge Shadur does not discuss this potential problem, it would arise
whenever a non-Illinois federal court must apply Illinois law to resolve an
issueYm Should that court consider, for instance, whether plaintiff could
have brought the case in the First District Appellate Court and thus apply
that law? Such consideration would raise problems of indeterminate state
venue because in Illinois venue is generally proper in the county of residence
of any defendant.?' Moreover, domestic and authorized foreign corporations
are, for venue purposes, "residents" of any county in which they do busi-
ness.m In such a context, it would seem far more appropriate for that
"foreign" federal court to employ the well-settled Erie predictive and Klaxon
formulae. In fact, failure to do so might conflict with recent Supreme Court
choice-of-law pronouncements. "3
Second, and perhaps more to the point, Klaxon's focus is on traditional
choice-of-law principles-those arising in the context of interstate (domestic
vs. foreign jurisdiction), rather than intrastate, transactions. When Klaxon
was decided in 1941, the prevailing choice-of-law rules used by state courts
reflected those principles announced by the first Restatement of Conflict of
Laws. In tort cases, state courts generally applied the law of the state
where the injury or death occurred: lex loci delictus.225 In contract actions,
L. REv. 9 (1986); Cotter, Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Company: Rule
or Relic?, 4 CooLEY L. REv. 101 (1986); Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to
the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YAE L.J. 1077 (1987).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
219. See supra text accompanying note 211.
220. Under Klaxon, that federal court would apply the choice of law rule of the state in
which it sits, 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941), and that rule presumably would point to Illinois
substantive law.
221. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-101 (1987).
222. Id. 2-102(a).
223. For a federal court to be Erie-and Klaxon-bound by a decision of an appellate court in
a district which has no interest nor any significant contact with the issue to be resolved raises
constitutional concerns. See infra note 230.
224. See Cotter, supra note 217, at 104.
225. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 377-78 (1934).
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depending upon whether the issue was one of validity or performance, the
law of the place of making or the place where the performance was to occur
governed. 22 All that was decided in Klaxon was that the federal court in
Delaware should follow the conflict of laws rules prevailing in the state in
which it sits. "? 7 The conflict of laws rules contemplated by Klaxon are those
rules, whether they be traditional First Restatement of Conflict of Laws
method or one of the more modern approaches,2n which would direct the
forum jurisdiction to apply the law of another jurisdiction. The intrastate
precedential effect of intermediate- state court decisions on state courts as
exemplified by Thorpe/Garcia is an apple, or better yet an asparagus,
compared to Klaxon's orange! What is clearly understood by students (and
critics)2" of Klaxon is that Erie does not permit federal courts to fashion
their own choice-of-law rules or to substitute their "better view" for that
approach adopted by a state7 0 Thus, there can be no federal common law
of choice-of-law.
226. Id. §§ 332, 358.
227. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). The Third Circuit in Klaxon had not done so; instead it
adopted the "better view" without regard to Delaware law. 115 F.2d 268, 275 (3d Cir. 1940).
228. See e.g., Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171 ("interest analysis" isolates issues and identifies policy interests underlying them)
(reprinted in B. CuRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963)); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1969) (tests seek "most significant relationship" to
parties, suit and forum where suit brought); A. VON Mim N & D. TRuTAN , THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMs 76 (1965) ("functional approach ... aims at solutions that are the
rationat elaboration and application of the policies and purposes underlying specific legal rules
and the legal system as a whole."); R. LEI'AR, AMERCAN CONFLICTS LAW 195 (3d ed. 1977)
("choice-influencing considerations ... (A) Predictability of results; (B) Maintenance of inter-
state and international order; (C) Simplification of the judicial task; (D) Advancement of the
forum's governmental interests; (E) Application of the better rule of law.").
229. See, e.g., Wolkin, Conflict of Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era, 94 U. PA. L.
Rav. 293, 295 (1946). But see R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 215, at 591-92 & nn.17, 20 (3d ed.
1986) (federal courts are unlikely to develop unitary system of choice-of-law rules better than
those created by the states); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 216-24 (1965) (image of
federal courts impartially deciding choice-of-law issues is illusory).
230. The only exception to a state's otherwise freely chosen choice-of-law method arises when
application of a state's choice-of-law rule would be constitutionally impermissible under the
full faith and credit clause or the due process clause. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797,, 822 (1985) ("Given Kansas' lack of 'interest' in claims unrelated to that State, and
the substantive conflict with jurisdictions such as Texas, we conclude that application of Kansas
law to every claim in this case is sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional
limits") (footnote omitted). See generally Miller & Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986)
(advocating legislative solution to jurisdictional problems of multistate class actions). Phillips
was the first Supreme Court decision in more than 38 years striking down as unconstitutional
a forum court's application of forum law. See D. WEINTRAUB, supra note 227, at 527. See also
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (forum had a "significant aggregation of
contacts with the parties and the occurrence" such that application of its law was "neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" in violation of the due process clause or the full faith and
credit clause). See generally Symposium: Choice-of-Law Theory After Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Hague, 10 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1 (1981) (discussing constitutional restraints on choice-of-law
processes).
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But Klaxon does not suggest, as Judge Shadur asserts, that a federal court
in the first district appellate court is "bound" by a decision of that state
court. Returning to our Smith/Jones hypothetical surrogacy scenario, let us
assume that the contract was made in Iowa, that Mrs. Jones during her
pregnancy was to stay with the Smiths in Iowa, and was to deliver her baby
in Iowa with subsequent adoption in Iowa. Let us further assume that Mrs.
Jones moved to Iowa (or to another state) after the Smiths properly filed
the case in federal court, the Northern District of Illinois. Under Illinois'
choice of law approach, the governing law is that of the place with the most
significant relationship to the issue.23" ' In the hypothetical Smith v. Jones
case, it is most likely that Illinois choice-of-law rules would require appli-
cation of Iowa law.232 Judge Shadur, however, would have the federal court
adopt a decision (assuming one exists) of the First District Appellate Court
because proper venue would presumably have lain there. 233 The effect is that
the Smiths' day in Judge Shadur's federal court ends with a result far
different than would be reached in the vast majority of the nation's federal
courts and in any Illinois state court, presuming those courts employ the
"choice-of-law" contemplated by Klaxon, i.e., in Illinois, the law of the
place with the most significant relationship. 23 Although surely unintended
by Judge Shadur, the result logically flows from his appellate court adherence
approach.
Judge Shadur has also noted the possible tension between two lines of
Supreme Court pronouncements on the issue of ascertaining state law. 235
However, the alleged tension between such decisions as Estate of Bosch23 6
and Bernhardt23 7 and those of Fidelity Union2 8 and Klaxon is, at best
superficial, or, at least resolvable.
In Bosch, the Court needed to determine state law in order to resolve a
federal tax issue.2 9 The Court explicitly stated that appellate court decisions
231. See Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d 136, 144, 395 N.E.2d
990, 996 (1979).
232. Illinois courts examine several factors: the place of contracting, negotiation and per-
formance; the location of the subject matter of the contract; and the domicile, residence, place
of incorporation and business of the parties. Illinois Tool Works v. Sierracin Corp., 134 Ill.
App. 3d 63, 479 N.E.2d 1046 (1st Dist. 1985); Boise Cascade Home & Land Corp. v. Utilities,
Inc., 127 Ill. App. 3d 4, 468 N.E.2d 442 (1st Dist. 1984); Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil
Construction Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d 136, 395 N.E.2d 990 (1st Dist. 1979).
233. See Rizzo v. Means Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115, 1132-33 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (appendix
to memorandum opinion).
234. The hypothetical further assumes that Iowa courts validate surrogacy contracts and that
the First District Appellate Court in Illinois does not-or vice versa.
235. National Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F. Supp. 147, 148-49 & n.2 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
236. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1%7).
237. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
238. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940). See supra note 21.
239. Erie-type issues clearly arise in settings other than diversity. See supra note 16.
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are only part of the data examined by a court to ascertain that state's law. 0
Bernhardt teaches that it is appropriate for a federal court to follow an
elderly decision of a state supreme court provided there is no confusion in
that state's decisions, "no developing line of authorities" casting shadows
over the aged decision 241-in short, where the state supreme court decision
is aging but healthy. Twenty-six years before Bosch and 15 years before
Bernhardt, Fidelity Union instructed that there should not be, on the same
legal issue, one rule of law for state court litigants and another rule for
federal court litigants.242 Klaxon later required a federal court to apply the
choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. However, these earlier cases
do not present a true conflict with the Bosch/Bernhardt guidelines.
The later decisions describe a process in which a court examines lower
state court decisions merely to predict how the state's highest court would
rule. However, this approach of Bosch and Bernhardt may be harmonized
with the earlier Fidelity Union doctrine. By applying the law which would
be adopted by the state supreme court, the federal court, as mandated by
Fidelity Union, avoids applying a rule different from that which would
ultimately be applied in state court. Moreover, the federal court in Fidelity
Union was not faced with conflicting state decisions which suggested that
the state's highest court would disagree with the existing state court decision.
Instead, a sole nisi prius state court decision was the only evidence of how
the New Jersey Supreme Court would interpret a new state statute'' 3 Finally,
as noted above, Klaxon's holding does not implicate intrastate "choice-of-
law" doctrines such as Thorpe/Garcia. Thus, what little guidance the Su-
preme Court has offered in the area of ascertaining state substantive law
can also be easily incorporated into divination of a state's choice-of-law
approach.
Once Fidelity Union and Klaxon are synthesized with Bosch and Bernhardt,
it becomes apparent not only that the two sets of cases are reconcilable, but
also that the latter set is much more relevant to ascertaining state law in the
240. Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465 (1967). Directly addressing Erie situations, the Court said:
[Ulnder some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an inter-
mediate state appellate court ruling... [Tlhe underlying substantive rule involved
is based on state law and the State's highest court is the best authority on its own
law. If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply what
they find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other
courts of the State. In this respect, it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state
court.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This language clearly seems to resolve whatever
ambiguities are presented by the mandate of Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169
(1940).
241. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956).
242. Fidelity Union, 311 U.S. at 180.
243. The existence in Fidelity Union of only one apposite state court decision further suggests
that Fidelity Union does not mandate the Shadur approach, which by definition is used to
ascertain state law among conflicting lower court decisions. Thus, Fidelity Union, like Klaxon,
see supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text, may be irrelevantto Judge Shadur's approach.
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Thorpe/Garcia situation, which will always present conflicting evidence as
to what is the relevant state substantive rule. This is so because under
Thorpe/Garcia there may be as many "Illinois law" voices, five, as there
are districts. In this setting, it is far more appropriate to discern intelligently
rather than to follow blindly. In fact, this is what courts have done,2" and
quite properly so.Y3 A "federal judge need no longer be a ventriloquist's
dummy." 2
244. E.g. Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 674-76 (2d Cir. 1983); Southern Pac.
Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1227, 123845 (E.D. Cal. 1978). See also cases cited
supra note 199.
In Saloomey, the Second Circuit, after extensive analysis, concluded that despite a 1977
Connecticut Supreme Court decision applying the rule of lex loci delicti (place of injury) in
automobile tort cases, Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1977), the
district court properly predicted that the Connecticut Supreme Court would apply the "most
significant relationship" test of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O CONFLICT OF LAWs in a wrongful
death action arising from an aviation accident. The Second Circuit found persuasive several
facts: Connecticut had already rejected lex loci delicti in workers' compensation actions,
Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 675 n.6 (citation omitted); Gibson had presented "no compelling reason
to abandon the traditional rule," id. at 674 (citation omitted); and the most significant
relationship approach comports with Gibson's emphasis on easily determined and easily applied
rules, and predictable results. Id. at 675 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit analysis is
certainly within the contemplation of Bosch and Bernhardt. Both the district court and Second
Circuit in Saloomey employed not only the Erie-ly correct method but also reached the "right"
predictive result. See O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 519 A.2d 13 (1986) (most
significant relationship approach governs where application of lex loci delicti would produce
arbitrary, irrational result). But cf. Habenicht v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 660 F. Supp. 52 (D.
Conn. 1986) (mem.) (because there are meaningful contacts with state in which injury occurred,
Connecticut courts would continue to follow the doctrine of lex loci delicti) (decided six weeks
prior to O'Connor).
In Southern Pacific, the court noted the parallel obligations placed on a federal court to
determine state law under the directive of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1982), and in an action based on diversity jurisdiction. 462 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (E.D. Cal.
1978). After an exhaustive examination of relevant Nevada and Ninth Circuit decisions, the
court concluded that no reason existed to expect that the Nevada Supreme Court would depart
from a clear line of lex loci delicti precedent and adopt the most significant relationship
approach to choice-of-law issues. Id, at 1245. While later Nevada cases have adopted the
Second Restatement approach in contracts cases, see Engel v. Ernst, 102 Nev. 391, 395, 724
P.2d 215, 216-17 (1986) (per curiam); Constanzo v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 101
Nev. 277, 279, 701 P.2d 747, 748 (1985) (per curiam); Sievers v. Diversified Mortgage Investors,
95 Nev. 811, 815, 603 P.2d 270, 273 (1978), the vested rights theories of the First Restatement
still apply in Nevada with respect to tort cases. See, e.g., Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D.
438, 447-49 (D. Nev. 1987); Hubbard Business Plaza, 649 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Nev. 1986); Tweet
v. Webster, 610 F. Supp. 104 (D. Nev. 1985).
For examples of successful ascertainment of Illinois choice of law, see Overseas Dev. Disc
Corp. v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 686 F.2d 498, 510-11 n.43 (7th Cir. 1982); Zlotnick v.
MacArthur, 550 F. Supp. 371, 373 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Adams Laboratories, Inc. v. Jacobs
Eng'g Co., 486 F. Supp. 383, 389 n.6 (N.D. I1. 1980), in which each federal court noted the
Illinois trend of adopting the "most significant contacts test" where the contracts in issue were
performed and executed in more than one state. Boise Cascasde Home & Land Corp. v. Utilities,
Inc., 127 Il1. App. 3d 4, 12, 468 N.E.2d 442, 448 (lst Dist. 1984).
245. See supra note 240.
246. C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 373 (4th ed. 1983). Professor Wright continues:
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A final drawback of the Shadur approach concerns the developmental
impact on state law of federal court determinations of state law. Although
the predictive approach may sometimes make the "wrong" guess,2 47 Judge
Shadur's formula stretches Erie and Klaxon too far. Erie and its progeny
do and must afford federal courts some latitude in ascertaining state law.
And when they do predict how the state's highest court would decide the
issue, the impact of that federal court decision is not insignificant. For
example, it has been suggested that federal judges in diversity cases have
made a disproportionate, though valuable, contribution to the development
of state common law.2 The same impact would result, of course, whenever
a federal court enunciates state law in cases involving pendent or federal
question jurisdiction. 9 The Shadur approach, therefore, would greatly limit
the federal influence in this area.
Of course, one could argue that the outcome of the Marshall/Shadur
debate is of little importance because the range of legal areas in which federal
judges must apply state, as opposed to federal, law is shrinking. Judge
Friendly's hosannas to Erie in 1964 were accompanied by a faith that, in
burying the notion of federal general common law, Erie opened the way for
"specialized federal common law," a development that has gone far and
may likely go further.2 Just three years later, Judge Skelly Wright noted
the rapidly expanding coverage of federal law which superseded or preempted
state law, thus "persistently shrinking state law's traditional subject-matter
enclave."2' Judge Wright's comment, that "state law, in many of the eddies
where it does still govern, is no more secure than a tenancy at will, terminable
at Washington's pleasure, ' 252 while perhaps an exaggeration, is equally, if
not more, valid today. 2
3
246. C. WasusT, supra note 5, at 373 (4th ed. 1983). Professor Wright continues:
Instead he is free, just as his state counterpart is, to consider all the data the highest
court of the state would use in an effort to determine how the highest c6urt of the
state would decide. This is as it should be. Unless this much freedom is allowed
the federal judge, the Erie doctrine would simply have substituted one kind of
forum-shopping for another. The lawyer whose case was dependent on an old or
shaky state court decision that might no longer be followed within the state would
have a strong incentive to maneuver the case into federal court, where, on the
mechanical jurisprudence that the Erie doctrine was once thought to require, the
state decision could not have been impeached.
Id. at 373-74 (footnote omitted).
247. See, e.g., Collins Co. v. Carboline, 837 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1988).
248. Landes & Posner, supra note 111, at 372 & n.13. In fact, one Illinois appellate court
once went so far as to chastise a state trial court for its failure to pay the "deference due to
decisions of our brethren in the [federal] Court of Appeals." See Nupnau v. Hink, 53 11. App.
2d 81, 91, 203 N.E.2d 63, 68-69 (1964).
249. See supra note 16.
250. Friendly, supra note 9, at 405.
251. Wright, supra note 76, at 329-30.
252. Id. at 330. Judge Wright predicted that "by the end of the 1980's ... courts... [will]
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This observation, however, must not lead to the conclusion that the
jurisprudential argument between Judges Shadur and Marshall is a mere
tempest in a teapot. For even if the size of the teapot (of applicable
substantive state law) may have decreased, it is still necessary to use fine tea
leaves to brew good tea; that is, to ascertain "unclear" state law in a manner
effectuating the Erie policy of parity between state and federal courts.
Further, given the present Supreme Court's narrower interpretation of federal
preemption in certain areas, 24 the importance of ascertaining state law may
even grow. The Marshall/Shadur conflict, therefore, remains significant in
achieving the proper balance between state and federal law. The ascertain-
ment of state law problems which triggers the judges' debate warrants the
Supreme Court's attention.2"
apply federal law in a large fraction of the cases for which, under diversity and Erie, they must
now hasten willy-nilly to the law of the states." Id. at 336-37.
253. It is much beyond the scope of this article to delineate in full those areas of state law
which have been superseded or preempted by federal law. A few recent instances will suffice.
See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (unionized employee's state law
claim based on bad faith handling of insurance claim preempted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (prohibiting states from regulating activities protected, prohibited,
or arguably affected by the National Labor Relations Act); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1982) (preempting state law actions based on legal or equitable rights equivalent to rights
afforded under the Copyright Act of 1976). The proposed Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, S. 2760, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986) and calls for a uniform aviation disaster law, see Air
Disaster Litigation: Hearings on H.R. 1027 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-45
(1981), id. 2d Sess. 51-137 (1982); J. Kennelly, The Air Travel Protection Act, 29 TRLL LAW.
GUIDE 63 (Spring 1985), would, of course, also affect state law tort remedies. For a further
discussion of federal pre-emption see Pincus & Dial, Federal Preemption of State Law Claims,
4 THE LABOR LAWYER 53 (Winter 1988); Kubasek, State Plant Closing Legislation and Pre-
emption by ERISA, 17 STETsoN L. REv. 319 (1988); Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy:
A Call for the Federalization of Personal Property Security Law, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
53 (Spring 1987).
254. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988) (§ 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act does not preempt a retaliatory discharge claim brought
by a unionized employee). For an analysis of the impact of Lingle, see Yonover, Preemption
of State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge in the Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly
Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, (forthcoming in S.D.L. REV. (1989)); Note, Retali-
atory Discharge, Workers' Compensation and Section 301 Preemption, Lingle v. Norge Div.
of Magic Chef, Inc., 37 DEPAut L. REv. 675 (1988).
255. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Exxon v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-bas,
108 S. Ct. 1572 (1988), may afford the Court the opportunity to comment on a federal court's
duty to ascertain state law in diversity cases. The Court may thus shed light on the Marshall/
Shadur dispute. At issue in Exxon is whether the Fifth Circuit should set aside its original
ruling, 828 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1987), and reconsider the case in light of a Texas intermediate
appellate court decision. The state court rendered its decision while Exxon's request for rehearing
was pending before the Fifth Circuit. The Texas state court decision conflicted with the judgment
of the federal court.
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III. CONCLUSION
It has been fifty years since Justice Brandeis said that "le]xcept in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State . . . There is no federal general
common law." 256 Since Erie, however, fifty years of jurisprudence and critical
commentary has not solved in a true and lasting fashion the dilemma of
ascertaining the state law to be applied. Erie itself offered little practical
guidance as to how to determine the applicable state law when the Court
stated: "whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in
a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern." 2" Quite often, federal courts are confronted with an issue which
has been addressed neither by the concerned state's legislature nor by its
highest court.
In the first few years after Erie, the Supreme Court displayed a remarkable
inclination towards giving great effect to decisions of state nisi prius and
intermediate appellate courts,258 perhaps as witness to the strength of the
Swift v. Tyson counter-revolution. But, the "excesses of 311," as these 1940
Supreme Court decisions were dubbed, 259 gave way to a more restrained
approach. Later Supreme Court decisions focused on whether the relevant
intermediate appellate court decisions were, in fact, good and reliable indicia
of how that state's supreme court would resolve the posed issue, 26 or on
whether an aged decision of a state's highest court would still best describe
that state court's position. 261
An end-run around ascertainment of state law dilemmas is found in the
doctrines of abstention 2 2 and certification.2 63 The Supreme Court first enun-
ciated one form of abstention-Pullman abstention-in 1941264 and encour-
aged certification, in appropriate circumstances, 19 years later. 265 However,
neither abstention nor certification furnish a panacea for Erie ascertainment
256. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
257. Id.
258. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). "If there be no
decision by [the state's highest] court then federal judges must apply what they find to be the
state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the state. In this
respect, [a federal court] may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court." Id. at 465
(citation omitted).
261. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956) (federal court is free
to consider "later authority," "fracture" in the later decisions, and "legislative movement" to
change the earlier result, in determining state law and need not adhere blindly to state court
decisions). See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
262. See supra notes 43-78 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 79-133 and accompanying text.
264. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
265. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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of state law ills. For example, in order to conclude that Pullman abstention
would be appropriate in a given case, a federal judge may first have to
determine the clarity of the state statute and/or its interpretation by state
courts 2 66 thus raising anew an Erie ascertainment quandary. Similarly, cer-
tification, while available in almost forty states, 26 7 does not resolve the Erie
problem completely. It is a discretionary procedure, 26 8 and federal judges are
often loathe to impose upon litigants the additional expense and delay
necessitated by certification.2 9 Federal judges also voice concern about the
increased burden on state courts which certification imposes.2 70 Finally, not
all states that have certification procedures permit their use by federal district,
as opposed to federal appellate, courts.2 71
By far the most frequently employed method to ascertain state law is the
classic predictive approach, espoused by Judge Marshall of the Northern
District of Illinois and the vast majority of federal judges and commentators
who have considered the issue in the last five decades. However, Judge
Shadur, joined by one other judge in the Northern District of Illinois2 72 and
echoed in just two other federal cases,273 posits a substantially different
method. When no authority from the state's highest court exists and inter-
mediate appellate court decisions are in conflict, in certain circumstances
Judge Shadur believes himself constrained by Erie and its progeny to give
determinative weight to decisions of Illinois' first district appellate court,
which sits in the same geographical district as the Northern District of
Illinois.
Judge Shadur's internal choice of law solution to the Erie problem, while
initially attractive (because the same result arguably would obtain in state
and federal courthouses "a block away" from each other), is flawed. 7 4
Instead, it is the predictive approach that, while at times susceptible to error,
remains the best method to effectuate Erie's policy of achieving parity
between state and federal courts.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
267. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
272. Judge Leinenweber has adopted Judge Shadur's approach. See supra note 30.
273. See supra note 184.
274. See supra notes 191-246 and accompanying text.
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